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Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this.
One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end:
"The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer."
This is actually quite reassuring - what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint.
".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint."
That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security.
From what I understand Tim is doing, and I greatly admire, is trying to avoid a judicial requirement that they be able to do this on demand. The so called "back door" requirement, because he knows, as others do, that such a feature would be used by more than the intended audience, and for more than the intended uses, to the detriment of Apple's users.
What I really find amazing is that I was at a talk hosted by the East-West Institute where the Air Force General of the new cyber command (whose name escapes me) complained that "we" (silicon valley) had let the government down by not writing strong enough crypto to keep our adversaries out. I remarked that it was the ITARS regulation and the Commerce department at the behest of the NSA which had tied our hands in that regard, and that with a free reign we would have, and could do, much better. Whit Diffie was there and also made the same point with them. And now, here we are 10 years later, and we "fixed" it, and now its our fault that they can't break into this stuff? Guess what? Our adversaries can't either!
The right to privacy, and the right of companies to secure that right with technology for their customers, is a very important topic and deserves the attention. I am really glad that one of the most valuable companies in the world is drawing a bright line in the sand. So I really support Tim's position on this one.
I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments).
If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially?
And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to build it?
"Impossible" should mean "impossible", not "not yet done, but possible".
"...and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint."
As long as we're on the topic of encryption, phones, and law enforcement it's worth keeping in mind that in the US at least courts can compel you to unlock your phone with Touch ID, even though they can't compel you to give them a password. Communicating a password is considered speech, so self-incriminating speech is protected by the fifth amendment. Physically holding your finger to a device is not considered speech and so it's not protected.
I think this is an interesting, and perhaps underappreciated, aspect of a shift from passwords to biometrics for verifying identity. It would shift the power dynamic between civilians and government a bit - here in the US at least.
Of course, hopefully no one is in a situation where they need to protect themselves against over-reaching or unjust government officials any time soon.
http://www.engadget.com/2014/10/31/court-rules-touch-id-is-n...
Absolutely. I'm quite amazed they had the guts to go through with this and I applaud it. I will support them with my dollars as much as possible.
What it sounds like is they've been asked to prepare a new OS release that allows an unlimited number of attempts to enter the passphrase via some network link. The press release is written to sound like without a software release, it wouldn't be possible to mount this kind of attack, however attacks like this are generally possible regardless of having some specially modified and signed OS image: for example, by cutting power to the hardware precisely when it is clear a password was incorrect, before the hardware has time to implement any destructive actions. Attacks like this have been used against SIM cards since the 90s.
I'm ambivalent regarding Apple's stance. In principle they are doing the right thing, but in practice, it seems they may be kicking up a whole lot of fuss over a relatively minor issue (with the exception that providing an easy means to brute force a phone to the authorities sets a horrible precedent). As for creating a universal backdoor, it seems highly unlikely they couldn't produce a signed OS / coprocessor firmware image that wasn't locked to one of the various serial numbers associated with this particular device
edit: as mentioned below, this order entirely originates with Apple's use of DRM to prevent software modification. Had users actual control over the devices they own the FBI wouldn't need to request a signed firmware in the first place. Please think twice about what Apple might really be defending here before downvoting
The government wants Apple to disable the auto-erase after so many unlock attempts. Apple argues in this letter that with modern computing power, this amounts to a backdoor.
The details of the gov't request are in another story on the HN front page
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160216/17393733617/no-ju...
Like you, I appreciate the sentiment - happy to hear Apple speaking up. However this shouldn't change how we use Apple products. I operate under the implication that the device is compromised from the factory. Closed source software cannot be trusted, good faith is not enough.
> here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this
I would assume that Google, Facebook, and Amazon are already sending every single keystroke we type straight to all the three letter agencies pretty much in real time. (I also assume the same about Apple, so I'm not sure what to make of this open letter.)
Why wold Google and Facebook get behind this? They store their customers data in a way they can access and subsequently have to give it to persecuters when there's a court order
I'm surprised that nobody on this thread has commented on the real substance of this response. It has nothing to do with Apple brute forcing iPhones for the police (which it has done for years, with a simple court order) - but instead, is Apple making it abundantly clear, that if they comply (or are forced to comply) with the All Writs Act of 1789 to create this particular back door, then that opens the floodgate moving forward for all sorts of requests to add backdoors/decrease security.
It's entirely possible, that the FBI can then use this precedent to simply have Apple remove all security from an iPhone in pursuit of an active investigation, which can be done with a straightforward firmware update - which IOS users tend to do without much thought.
Ok, so I completely fail to see how a random crazy guy with a gun who shoots up a bunch of unarmed people has "national security implications". This seems to be a "fact" that everyone wants to agree on, but is frankly a load of BS if one considers the government probably already has his entire call/texting history for the last couple years.
I see this as just another "its for the children" ploy, of which I'm completely sick of.
In that I fully support Apple/etc for finally gaining a backbone. If more people stood up, then I wouldn't have to be naked body scanned at the airport, or the dozens of other privacy invasions the government performs on a daily basis simply to give themselves something to do. So, rather than admit they won't ever be able to predict or protect the population in any meaningful way from random people willing to give their lives to make a statement, they waste our time and money coming up with ever more invasive ways to peek into everyone's most private possessions.
Even though the matters are slightly different, I couldn't help but think that Cook is giving off a Boards of Canada vibe in this post (in a good way).
"Now that the show is over, and we have jointly exercised our constitutional rights, we would like to leave you with one very important thought: Some time in the future, you may have the opportunity to serve as a juror in a censorship case or a so-called obscenity case. It would be wise to remember that the same people who would stop you from listening to Boards of Canada may be back next year to complain about a book, or even a TV program. If you can be told what you can see or read, then it follows that you can be told what to say or think. Defend your constitutionally protected rights - no one else will do it for you. Thank you."
If the UK record on anti-terror scope creep is anything to go by, not creating this backdoor is a very good idea.
In the UK, laws originally intended for surveilling terrorists were/are routinely used by local councils (similar to districts I think) to monitor whether citizens are putting the correct rubbish/recycling into the correct bin. [1]
This is a pandora's box, and the correct answer is not to debate whether we should open it just this once, it's to encase it in lead and throw it into the nearest volcano. Good on Apple for "wasting" shareholders money and standing up for this.
[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3333366/Half-of-counc... - and lest the source be questioned, this is one of the more reactionary newspapers in the UK.
Tim Cook: a really nice guy with blue whale-sized cohones.
There can be no compromise because China, Syria and Turkey would also lean on Apple to break into phones of dissidents, and pretty soon, future whistleblowers here in US too in order to prevent leaks (iPhone 7 and iCar notwithstanding).
That's the tradeoff in not giving in to faint, vague "maybes" that there were "external coordination" when in all likihood it was the ultraconservative, Saudi half leading this duo into the kookooland of violent extremism.
The security services will just have to buy exploits, develop malware, cultivate human intelligence sources and monitor everything the old-fashioned way... It's not like that kid in a YouTube video finding a jailbreak exploit for an iPhone and not releasing a tool is going to sit on it, he's going to auction it off to the shop or country with the most $$$.
Im generally not an apple supporter(i dont like the closed eco system), i am very plesantly surprised they posted this.
I am quite disappointed that the us courts are trying to force apple todo this, and in my opinion, its just to use this case to set a precedent.
I hope Apple cant get it to work, but id hate to see what the courts would do if that happened.
I'm really impressed that Apple is standing up to the government and protecting its users' rights. I've never really considered the iPhone worth the premium price tag, but policies like this have changed my mind.
Could someone answer a question I have though? The government wants Apple to create this backdoor and tailor it to the specific device, so presumably it will have a line that goes
if (!deviceID.equals("san_b_device_id"))
return;
Publicizing the case themselves in a very good move.
However, the iPhone of the attacker is an iPhone 5C, which does not have Touch ID or a Secure Enclave. This means that the time between passcode unlock attempts is not enforced by the cryptographic coprocessor. More generally, there's no software integrity protection, and the encryption key is relatively weak (since it is only based on the user's passcode).
The amount of work needed to turn security into good user experience is phenomenal: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
This may be one of the most important things Apple has done. Whether or not you agree with their position, it's incredibly important that tech companies start publicly explaining things like the fundamental problems with backdoors so that a lay person can understand it. Apple have the credibility to make non-technical people take their argument seriously, and the reach to get the message out to a vast number of people. I'm really pleased they're taking this position.
This is interesting:
"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession."
Am I reading this right? Apple, if they chose to, can make a version of iOS that disables security features and encryption and load it onto existing phone even though the phone is locked and encrypted?
Very impressive letter. They've expressed their position in language that a layman can understand, there's abundant evidence that they respect the intent of the law authorities, and even clearer evidence that they are drawing a line in the sand based on their principles. They will protect their customers.
I wish more companies could speak so clearly and courageously.
This is the sort of thing that a professional organization - like what medical doctors have - could help with. Let me explain.
The court order gives Apple an out: "To the extent that Apple believes that compliance with this Order would be unreasonably burdensome, it may make an application to this Court for relief".
Now, imagine if this was court ordering a company to engage in unethical medical procedures, rather than unethical software development. The professional medical community would sanction doctors that cooperated and support those that stood by their ethical principles and refused to cooperate. If there was a similar professional organization for software development, Apple could reasonably rebut that telling their engineers to work on this would be unreasonably expensive (since they'd expect to fire people or have them resign over it).
This is another avenue for fighting the order - have a good chunk of Apple's engineering department sign an open letter saying that they'd resign before working on that project. The incentives seem like they'd work for making it a thing.
So the FBI is asking Apple to build a tool that will unlock security measures of an existing iPhone, like the one in the San Bernadino shooting, and allow it to be read.
The problem with this is that no such tool should be possible to build. It should not be a matter of yes or no; it should be simply impossible for Apple to build such a tool without the private key of the user, which Apple does not have.
If it is possible to write a piece of software which can circumvent the protections of the iPhone without the user's private key, then Apple wrote its security software incorrectly. Either they wrote it with an appalling lack of security understanding; or they left in important backdoors, either knowingly or through ignorance. But if they wrote the software correctly and did not create backdoors of which they're aware, then the government's request is actually impossible -- cannot be done.
So which is it, Apple? Is the point moot because you did this right? Or have you already placed backdoors in the product which the FBI is now asking you to exploit for their benefit?
I see a lot of people saying they're impressed, admired, etc. at Apple for doing this.
It's not about giving props: Apple is not doing this out of goodwill, or because they believe in protecting privacy. Apple has a competitive advantage against Google/Facebook in that its business model does not depend on violating their customer's privacy.
They are just exploiting that competitive advantage.
Cfr. https://ar.al/notes/apple-vs-google-on-privacy-a-tale-of-abs...
> "Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession."
So there is already a backdoor. Apple are refusing to let the FBI use the backdoor.
The backdoor is the fact that Apple can push a firmware update that disables security features, without the device's password being entered at any point.
I like the position apple is taking, However, after reading the letter, I noticed it misses a point I consider even more important than just "a dangerous precedent".
Apple is selling devices on the whole planet, not just in the USA. So, what's the FBI (an American agency) is requesting is not dangerous for only American citizen, but also for iPhones' owners in Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania. Hell, these people are not even part of the debate, because they don't belong in the "American democracy".
If I'm going to be affected by someone else's policies, I would like to be at least allowed in the discussion.
As others have noted, this is probably mostly about branding. But that's why it is genius. Tim Cook is committing Apple to this pro-privacy position in a very public way. This means that a reversal of this position or a revelation that Apple has been acting contra it, would be extremely expensive to Apple's reputation with its customers, effectively costing the company a huge amount of money.
By publicly committing Apple to this cause, Cook makes it more likely that internal teams at Apple as well as future versions of the company will adhere to this position. By defining a set of actions which, if made public, would ruin the company's brand, Cook makes it less likely Apple will take those actions.
I'm clearly in the minority here, but I don't really understand Apple's position here, nor do I understand why everyone is rallying behind them.
Apple built hardware which was not particularly secure. The software defaults to a four-digit PIN. They attempt to mitigate this by adding an escalating interval between entries, and by optionally wiping the phone after too many failed tries, but this is not set in stone and those limits can be removed with a software update.
The government is coming to Apple and saying, "You can remove these limits. Do that for us on this phone." Coming as a legitimate court order, I see no problem with this request. The government isn't even asking them to crack the phone, they just want Apple to remove the limits so the government can try to brute force it. They're even paying Apple for their trouble.
If Apple didn't want to be put in a position where the government can ask them to compromise their users' privacy, they should have built hardware which even they couldn't crack. And of course they did; starting with the A7 CPUs, the "secure enclave" system prevents even Apple from bypassing these limits. The phone in question just happens to predate that change.
If the government was demanding that Apple do the impossible, I'd be on their side. If the government was demanding that Apple stop manufacturing secure phones, I'd be on their side. But here, all they're asking is for a bit of help to crack an insecure system. They're doing this in the open, with a court order. What's the problem?
There's a simple way to defeat Apple's argument. The judge could simply ask Apple to flash the new firmware on that phone, let the FBI run the brute force under their supervision and obtain the contents they need, and then flash back a non-compromised version of the OS.
The government would never have access to a phone with a compromised version of an OS that they could use to repeat this trick. Rather, the government would have to obtain court orders and have forensics done under supervision.
This isn't a backdoor and doesn't affect consumers, and sets a really high bar to trying to scale this for the government because it requires Apple as the gatekeeper every time to agree to do the one-off hack.
The cynic in me thinks that this letter is more about brand image. Apple wants to claim they can't hack their own phones, even if the government asks, but clearly in the case of the iPhone 5C it IS possible for them to do it, and this creates a contradiction with their public marketing and privacy position. If they didn't release this open letter, then simply complying with the judges order would make them look bad.
As far as I'm aware, the most proper attacks here are, in order of cost:
0) Find some errata. Apple presumably knows as much as anyone except NSA. Have plausible deniability/parallel construction.
1) OS level issues, glitching, etc. if the device is powered on (likely not the case). Power stuff seems like a particularly profitable attack on these devices.
2) Get Apple, using their special Apple key, to run a special ramdisk to run "decrypt" without the "10 tries" limit. Still limited by the ~80ms compute time in hardware for each try.
(vs. an iPhone 5S/6/6S with the Secure Enclave:)
3) Using fairly standard hardware QA/test things (at least chip-level shops; there are tens/hundreds in the world who can do this), extract the hardware key. Run a massively parallel cluster to brute force a bunch of passphrases and this hw key, in parallel. I'd bet the jihadizen is using a shortish weak passphrase, but we can do 8-10 character passphrases, too. They may have info about his other passphrases from other sources which could be useful.
While I'm morally against the existence of #3, I'm enough of a horrible person, as well as interested in the technical challenge of #3, that I'd be willing to do it for $25mm, as long as I got to do it openly and retained ownership. In secret one-off, $100mm. I'd then spend most of the profits on building a system which I couldn't break in this way.
I really hope they actually physically can't access the data on this phone. It's entirely possible this could be the case -- I've been trying to consider the vectors they could use:
- lightning cable delivered iOS patch (probably won't work because iOS won't negotiate over USB until you tap a dialog box)
- OTA update (not connected to internet)
- Cracking open the device and accessing the storage directly (encrypted until boot time)
The most likely vector I can think of:
- - Lightning cable delivered iOS patch from a trusted computer (i.e one that the terrorists actually owned)
It's quite impressive that Apple is taking a stand like this, though perhaps unfortunate timing WRT the larger encryption debate.
If you look at past cases where the All Writs Act has been invoked, the Courts have rejected this type of government conscription.
Effectively, the government is forcing Apple to take receipt of a device that it does not own or posses, then perform potentially destructive services on a device, and then perform services that could potentially require Apple to testify at a trial under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
I really think that Apple's in the clear here, and the AUSA's in the case are pulling all the stops to get Apple ordered to break the encryption.
The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn't that mean it already exists?
What Apple needs to do then instead of writing this letter, is release an update that closes this backdoor.
I've never been an Apple fan but this was a fantastic and bold move by them. Software security and hacking is already an enormous problem that every single person has to deal with. Even major companies like the NYTimes have been hacked by malicious users in the recent past. We need to take every reasonable action to combat this threat. Building deliberate vulnerabilities (yes, every backdoor is a vulnerability) into our software and devices is going to make all of us less safe, and all of us more vulnerable to unforeseeable attacks in the future.
Apple is doing the right thing, the American way, which has been forgotten, that puts freedom over security. Thanks Apple, don't give in. Their 1984 anti Big Brother superbowl ad has finally come to fruition[1].
I think, as a society, it boils down to this: "And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control."
Can a private, for profit, company deny the will of an elected government working to solve a heinous crime based not on what they say they will do but because they cannot give a 100% guarantee that this is the only time/way it'll be used? Apple acknowledges that the government is saying it's limited to this case but because there's no guarantee (100% certainty) they feel they can deny it?
If yes, what does that mean as a broader precedent. Are we comfortable with private companies denying an elected government based not on what they agree to, but instead because there's a chance it'll be used in other ways?
As terribly flawed one might feel about government very few would think it has less accountability than a private company.
Apple's encryption appears to be done in such a way that government entities can safely use them as well as "consumers." But what may happen, is that Apple will be force to produce 2 kinds of iPhones. One for consumers, with strong encryption, but a "backdoor" for warrant "cough" based access. 2nd type of iPhones for government use (string encryption, no backdoors)
They may already have this in place now, but what we are seeing now is a show. They are testing how people/consumers are going to react to this situation. Out government probably figures that nobody will care in the end.
In the USA, we have lost our liberty. It's time to wake up and see what is happening. It's getting worse & the people within our government are working hard to enslave us even more.
This is an interesting chapter in the "Tim will never be Steve" saga that so many people are infatuated with.
This particular hill that Tim Cook has decided to defend is as important as anything Steve Jobs ever did at Apple.
This is just huge hypocrisy and full of lies.
First of all, Apple CAN attempt to brute force the password.
Compiling whatever new firmware is needed and signing it with their keys will not introduce any new backdoor like they claimed and lied to the public - the backdoor is already there, and it is their private keys. Just like that "backdoor" somehow end up at some bad guy's hand, so could their private keys.
I would agree with Apple if they wanted FBI to pre-submit all their guessed passcodes for brute force for apple to try, and for apple to have the sole responsibility for that, so that getting said "backdoor" (which really is nothing more than a door handle) will be as hard as getting their private keys, and governments will not keep the said backdoor in their hands. I would also agree if Apple claimed they don't want to be able to crack devices at a judge's order (although that would be against the law - so they can't claim that).
But this is NOT what Apple said. This whole letter is just one big PR bulshit. They CAN brute force a passcode. They failed enforcing significant delay incurred when failing a passcode attempt - even tho this issue was already known for YEARS (will give citation if needed) when apple designed the discussed iPhone 5C - and they also failed requiring passcode to update the device. They already have their convenient backdoor in place in the form of their private keys.
If I understand correctly, any piece of software that would be used would need to be signed by Apple. Furthermore, the FBI's warrant(?) says specifically that it would only need to work for one device ID. Thus it would be relatively straightforward to create an update for the FBI that could pretty clearly only be used on the phone in question. Unless the FBI had Apple's signing key they could not reuse the software (assuming they couldn't break the bootloader chain of trust, which they apparently cannot if this is the route they are taking). Capability is not the grounds on which they are arguing.
This is a very clearly political refusal. Apple is saying that about as explicitly as they can in this message. Whether or not they can do it, Apple doesn't want to be caught in the game of being a government surrogate or having to determine for themselves if government requests are legitimate (imagine, say, if the Chinese government asked for data from a dissident's phone - would Apple want to risk that market by denying a request that they have complied with in the US?). It's unfortunate for them that the FBI is making this request while people still own phones like the 5c for which they could theoretically disable security features, as opposed to the newer phones which it is possible they are completely unable to defeat.
I know that because this is on hacker news, everyone is talking about whether it's possible to access the data, and if possible... how easy or how hard it is. But the focus should be on the whether there should be a clear line/understanding between security and privacy, or should we keep everything black and white as it is now, just looking at extreme cases?
If they cannot co-exist, I'd rather have more security and less privacy. But ideally, I shouldn't have to choose between them.
Link to the FBI order:
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714001/SB-Shoote...
(Edit: deleted part where I was wrong. Thanks robbiet480 for correcting me. It's 2am here and I was tired.)
Also, prediction: if Apple refuses to build a brute forcer, someone else will do it and sell it to the FBI. Just wait and watch.
If you oppose this, please let President Obama know. The FBI is part of the executive branch of the government, and as such, directly reports to the president. In other words, if he tells them to stop, they must comply. Please register your complaint here:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact
Here is my letter to them:
Dear President Obama,
I've voted for you in both elections, and have been a firm supporter on all your causes (affordable care act, and more). However, your FBI has clearly overstepped it's authority by demanding that Apple spend engineering resources building a software product that can break the encryption of a terrorist's iPhone.
Seriously, you need to stop this. You are the head of the executive branch of the government, of which the FBI is directly underneath your jurisdiction. Director James Comey is directly within your chain of command.
What the FBI is asking for is a master key to be created that can decrypt any iPhone. This makes all Americans with Apple devices insecure in the face of threats to our personal security and privacy. I hope you can understand that this is clearly unacceptable, and needs to be stopped.
I want to register my complete opposition to the FBI in this circumstance. Please stop this.
Thanks, xxxx
The important lesson here is that it is time to design the next phones in a way that makes it impossible to either install a software update without unlocking the device or implement auto-erase functionality in hardware.
That way for future phones at least, the issue would become moot: there would be no way for Apple to build and/or install a custom software image that allows brute-force password cracking.
I'm no security expert, but how would Apple access previously encrypted data with a different version of iOS? Doesn't having that ability imply they already have a "back-door"? Could someone explain what I'm missing here or is it more that that would be a one-off solution and the FBI is asking for a global, remote, no apple needed solution...
I remember the old dead community of OpenSource Phone - http://wiki.openmoko.org/wiki/Main_Page
if you are interested in the technical details of iOS security: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
Cannot be more glad to see Apple's stand on this. Let's not forget what happened with Blackberry some 5 years ago. India, Saudi Arabia and UAE got monitoring ability on its platform:-
1)http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/telecom/Go...
2) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-saudi-idUSTRE67...
3) http://www.thestar.com/business/2010/08/16/threats_of_blackb...