Chrome does disable extensions when an update requires new permissions, but that won't catch malicious updates to extensions that require extensive permissions for basic functionality.
Requires the extensions to be open source, of course.
Of course, this means that if anyone ever does install a malicious certificate on my phone, I'll be none the wiser. Thanks Google!
The cryptographic advice in this particular guide is not especially great. You can, for instance, safely ignore what it says about randomness (and, in particular, about how it interacts with FileVault's XTS block crypto). Its advice about password management is needlessly complex (if you trust Keychain, use Keychain Assistant to generate passwords, not OpenSSL --- but most of the cool kids just use 1Password, and they're right to do that).
[1] https://www.passwordstore.org/
Do you have a view on 1Password versus LastPass?
LastPass has been exploited a few times in ways that could have given up passwords. Their UX and server infrastructure seems to be a mess of php scripts, that itself doesn't have to be insecure but is a code smell. Their commercial support looks unmaintained. Both platforms support "cloud" based syncing but since 1Password's is pretty new I can't speak to it.
1Password does local encryption outside of the browser, LastPass will encrypt locally in the browser.
1Password can leverage other file transports to sync passwords, iCloud, DropBox, or any shared directory. LastPass does it all with their servers.
LastPass's web interface if compromised can have you give away the password to all your passwords. 1Password has a much smaller risk of this and would probably have to include a malicious software update.
1Password Families/Teams exists and I'm not familiar with it but it probably has a similar attack vector to LastPass's web interfaces.
You know, they both offer end to end encryption with similar attacks. Overall these companies are big targets and I'd rather keep my passwords offline or synced via side channels in a standalone app like 1Password.
PS I'd be amiss if I didn't mention dashlane https://www.dashlane.com/ I hear good things and it's passed review at a few companies who know their stuff, but that's all I know.
Use 1Password.
I don't even know what questions to ask. Much less choose the appropriate options.
And I'd have very different answers for my work and home gear.
I believe the intent is to ensure that it's understood the list isn't a requirement, but rather the varying options and levels of secure you can have based on your wants/needs.
When asking someone to create a threat model, you can begin with a simple question: "What are you afraid someone will do to your computer?" From this, you can then begin to piece through the list and look for items that address that.
Just care about malware? Look at the scanning tools.
Fearful that some bored teens in eastern europe are goofing around with hacking shit? Look at the security and notification tools
Think Putin is sending the new FSB/KGB after you for your exfiltrated борщ recipe? Look at the disk encryption section. (and perhaps professional help)
Maybe it could use some clarification, but I think the author's intent here was to convey that the list isn't a laundry list of "do this or your computer is going to be attacked", but more that you get what is required for your needs. Many of these tools require that you adopt different computing habits than traditional computing, and not all are applicable to every single use case.
But what I miss most, is a deeper analysis of the different launchd services and agents. - Especially which ones can be disabled and what features will be impacted.
It is quite opaque, especially considering the verbose descriptions of Windows Services out of the box.
I want to disable all these, for me, useless features: handoff, geo, maps, icloud, push, commCenter, spotlight web, siri, social integration, diagnostics reporting, and many more.
It has been a very annoying experience of seemingly unrelated parts of the OS breaking when Disabling anything, - and log spamming of unsuccessful attempts of using it.
It is a tool and should not push policy through arbitrary limitations. But it seems we are caught in a war of lock-in ecosystem providers. Kind of a more realistic version of the much used picture of corporation-states or societies in sci-fi.
Apart from this, hypothetically I might not only an end-user but also an admin who has to implement certain policies. The argument is never sound, there is always an economic or practical tradeoff and you are stuck somewhere and have to make it work and yours.
On what basis are you saying that?
That way we can find out what is gamed, or passd, or what the hell is pancake.apple.com for.
If your adversary is a 3 letter agency you'd better use no computer at all. If they can't subvert the OS (witch I doubt) they'll subvert the hardware (hello Intel ME).
I don't do most of this. I'm waiting until I decide to wipe my Mac and have plenty of time to play with it. (which is going to be when exactly? Not sure.)
Clone a copy of your drive (use something like super duper) and then simply boot from the cloned drive. The clone drive can be another physical drive (attached via USB) or just use disk utility to create a separate partition and clone a copy there.
I had a laptop of mine retrieved by the police from a big rubbish bin. The screen was broken, it did boot up though. Another time I had the broken screen after being hit by a car. These things happen and I am always sure I can get in even if keyboard/screen/mouse isn't an option. It is more useful for me to be able to somehow access my machine even if broken, I imagine there will be circumstances of that.
When the police retrieved my laptop I wasn't exactly worried about my obvious login password or whether I had locked down that mysql port sufficiently. The thief wasn't even literate so those extreme security measures wouldn't have helped.
the chain of trust is solid up until make and configure happen, at that point any number of things could happen so it's a question of whether or not you trust whatever scripts its running.
unless homebrew has some sort of enforcement on what that script can do it could do anything. This is why its a really good thing that homebrew does not require root.
Anything from our Homebrew/core (i.e. wget) uses the macOS sandbox to prevent writes outside of permitted locations.
Seems like MacOS does the reasonable thing and prompts for the firmware password if you use a different disk.
Google mostly shows you guides from merchants trying to get you buy AV licenses.
Keep in mind this is a very rigorous script and modifies Windows10 beyond recognition. Infact it kind of makes Win10 appear and function more like Windows8
The one I've found: http://hardenwindows10forsecurity.com/index.html
Unlike widely used and security-critical open source projects, right? Like, say, OpenSSL?
("All hardware sucks. All software sucks." This is at least as true these days as it was back on alt.sysadmin.recovery in the '90s)