History shows us that sites are popped on a regular basis and their users do not always find out right away. Sometimes the org in question doesn't even know for a while.
That doesn't make sense. If a password already takes longer than the age of the universe to practically brute-force, you're not meaningfully gaining anything by forcing users to change their passwords periodically. On the other hand, you are introducing more opportunities for mistakes to occur in what is already the most dangerous failure point (the human).
I left in a reasonable acknowledgement that technology changes can make currently safe passwords weak in the future. That's a good reason to change a password. But periodic password changes don't make sense unless "periodic" refers to timescales longer than anyone here has been alive, because it's inconsequential compared to the cover time provided by a strong password.
The argument that passwords should be rotated is mostly a response to users predominantly choosing weak passwords. But if you're in a position to enforce password rotation, you're also in a position to enforce strong passwords. Password rotation is a usability-reducing, incomplete and poor method of enforcing user safety. It is wholly superseded by encouraging people to use password managers, which is a much more optimal and complete solution that does not fatigue the user. Password managers make rotation obsolete, can incorporate password breach monitoring and be made virtually frictionless (they can be incorporated directly in the browser and turned on by default).
Give hashcat a go. Give me the hashes from HN. I bet we can break most of them in a day.
good luck