In a related vein, it seems characteristic of the kind of philosophy that the later Wittgenstein, and more recently Peter K Unger, criticise as linguistic illusion, of the sort 'If I have a ship and replace a plank, it remains the original ship, but if I replace every plank, does it become a new ship, or remain the same ship?' This is, to them, and to me, thinly veiled wordplay feigning as metaphysical insight. It extracts language from its normal use in concrete life and stands aghast then when one asks weird questions about one gets weird results.
Supertasks are real too. If you take Turing machine something like the lamplighter group pops up at the other end and you have no way to handwave that away.
Unless of course you subscribe to Fictionalism as your philosophy of mathematics, in which case stuff still has consequences just your epistemological stance changes from studying them in favour to some kind of mysticism that absolves you from the effort.
(And indeed, in practice, we can’t perform any infinite processes when we are computing Fourier transforms of real data, in either analog or digital systems. All real-world systems are based on approximations and imperfect models, full of measurement error, bugs in edge cases, etc.)
You have a very strange definition of “real”... or rather, it’s like the use in “real numbers” (i.e. a pure thought experiment / set of abstract manipulations of an abstract formal system with no physical embodiment), not the use in “physical reality”.
Every mathematical use of completed infinities inherently involves “mysticism”, and you seem to have embraced the absolution you mentioned. [Which is fine... accepting Cantor’s paradise on faith and not worrying about whether it is “real” or not has been very productive for mathematics, whether or not most of the same results could have been found in a more cumbersome way otherwise.]
It's not about them, nobody wished them. They came as necessity.
> Everything can be done using approximations
Approximations are analytical animals.
> with bounded error
I don't know how to bound errors without analysis.
> in finite steps.
By usage I didn't mean occasionally computing. (This is not free of problems. BTW you'd be horrified to know even finite purely combinatorial mathematics leads to irrational polytopes, ending up with infinities.) But using as a cornerstone of theory that allows for reasoning of epistemic value i.e. one affording symbolic manipulations that behave in a guaranteed way. Taking differences instead of differentials doesn't matter (why people bother if it were that easy). Whereas Finitism just shifts infinities elsewhere ending up with ultrafilter.
> You have a very strange definition of “real”
I didn't realize I used one. Or that reality has a definition (old problem in philosophy).
Or that it matters. Irrespective of what reality is mathematics can be ① real, ② have different being still connected to reality, ③ or be unreal with some mechanism for reasoning to cross the boundary to reality. First and last are troubling. Issues with the middle one is why there is a philosophy of mathematics at all.
> “real numbers”
Real numbers of course are called so for being perversion that they are. Do try get rid of them. Two centuries people have failed and still try intensely. They need a cheer.
> Every mathematical use of completed infinities inherently involves “mysticism”
I don't see what you could possibly mean. Any specifics?
Other than a lazy trollish attempt at obverting my position. To remind it is that Fictionalism absolves one from studying internal mechanics of fictional things. (Other than stop such worries, what use of invoking it?) You say mathematics is the same. In fact worse: mysticism gets in at every other point, inherently. (Why do I even bother replying…) Is it a cult? I assure you whenever a garden variety idol has deep feelings about eternity and numbers, there is a pushback https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.0244
Mathematics is a study, deals in mysticism as much as accounting: when infinities arise, their need and utility are studied, employed and scrutinized as generously as quantitative easing. If you find baffling mysticism plaguing your understanding, there is no shortage of philosophical equivalents of Bitcoin.
Maybe maths could help us understand biology or other non-maths fields better!
(Extra mystery: Why did we evolve phase-invariance?)
On the other hand, at a lower level of abstraction, the most fundamental theories of physics known do tend to involve real numbers and continuous functions – from my limited understanding, that applies even to quantum mechanics in many cases, even though it’s known for discretizing quantities that were continuous in classical mechanics. However, it’s unknown – unknowable, even, at some point – whether these infinities are “real”, or themselves approximations of even more fundamental laws.
"Why did your ear, the outer part and the inner bones and the canal and the fluids and the brain, all evolve together in a way that grants Fourier analysis for free? Coincidence? "
No, we model physical systems using math, so you should expect that a physical system involving dynamic systems to use Fourier transforms to effectively model that system. But the efficacy of math does not imply that mathematical objects exist.
"Maybe maths could help us understand biology or other non-maths fields better!"
Um, clearly. Math is extremely successful at describing many aspects of many sciences. But this does not imply mathematical objects exist and are describing the reality of what is occurring, despite providing accurate outputs.
But if your reality upholds logic, you'd have to be very careful as not to take any consequence of your usage of the Fourier transform to be a part of your reality or its description. In which case why use it at all?
Using it is, like I said, an ontological commitment inviting infinities into your system. You may not ascribe them physical meaning, or may renormalize them out, but you can't deny them (do try! though attempts at mathematical ultrafinitism are plagued by problems, whereas finitism, or various less purifying forms of constructive mathematics lead to infinities in just slightly different places).
What you may deny is the reality of the description (that is of you perceiving your reality) whatsoever as Fictionalists do.
Infinity has no physical counterpart or phenomenon. Though the Universe is vast and rapidly expanding, it is still finite. I don’t think supertasks are thinly veiled examples of wordplay, though. I think they’re useful thought experiments that may be the theoretical underpinning of some future form of computation.
I tend to agree.
Thomson's lamp paradox assumes that time is continuous, i.e., that time intervals are infinitely divisible. Physicists do not know whether that's the case. They don't know whether the space is continuous either, so Zeno's paradox also stands on very shaky foundations.
The construction of the nat-nums you alude too relies on infinity as an axiom, so the construction itself doesn't prove jack.
For all practical intents and purposes "infinity", in a very narrow sense, is indistinguishable from arbitrary large numbers.
Your rhethoric question leads to contradiction: By the same line of reasoning, if I don't know what the weather will be next year, that must mean it wont exist, so time is finite, which contradicts your implications.
(Oh no, am I a troll? I think I'm a troll now.)
The whole point of having no upset bound on numbers is that this kind of game can be continued arbitrarily.
But I think you can seriously make the argument that not only is "largest number" an empirical question, but the answer depends on your units. I'm not sure that's more absurd than the stuff in TFA.
However, what if we want to theorise about what, if anything, sits outside the observable universe? You seem to be suggesting that it will always be finite, which is optimistic to say the least. Just because we can't observe something doesn't mean that it isn't real, and that we won't get utility out of modeling it. Infinity might be out there.
https://personal.lse.ac.uk/ROBERT49/ebooks/PhilSciAdventures...
Looks like I have some new bedtime reading.
(Edit: At first I thought this book and Poundstone's book had a lot more overlap in their contents than they seem to on further reflection, which makes me more confident in my recommendation.)
False. A perfectly elastic ball would bounce back to the same height indefinitely.
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coefficient_of_restitution
So the variables that describe the system's state has to converge.
So, maybe, this question isn't so stupid:
...what's the point of this type of discussion? What real-world, non-theoretically-based situations, would I use this type of understanding in?
I've tried to figure it out and I'm not coming up with anything relevant. I know there is relevancy to be had here, I can see that, I'm just not figuring it out myself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation
But you can also sort of repeat your question with regard to those areas of computer science, because they don't appear to relate to computing devices that we could physically build, even though they might clarify things like how different groups of unsolvable problems relate to one another.
A commenter on the "Ask HN" question about good resources to learn about systems thinking mentioned the need to have a good understanding of stateful systems. Hilbert's Hotel is about state transition, it seems to me.
More prosaically, I thought of using Thompson's Lamp as an example to train some colleagues on how to use Matt Wynne's Example Mapping. The puzzles it presents might distract from the main point of the exercise though!
I hate reading about these types of things.