Also, TED and TEDx for popularizing pseudo intellectual garbage.
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/9/19/17879102/br...
Once they burned through those folks, they turned to cranks/homeopaths/etc
Biases are are not always errors. They can be cognitive shortcuts and optimizations that may be reasonable heuristic.
There Is More to Behavioral Economics Than Biases and Fallacies http://behavioralscientist.org/there-is-more-to-behavioral-s...
> A widespread misconception is that biases explain or even produce behavior. They don’t—they describe behavior. The endowment effect does not cause people to demand more for a mug they received than a mug-less counterpart is prepared to pay for one. It is not because of the sunk cost fallacy that we hang on to a course of action we’ve invested a lot in already. Biases, fallacies, and so on are no more than labels for a particular type of observed behavior, often in a peculiar context, that contradicts traditional economics’ simplified view of behavior.
>The conversation around biases is almost uniformly negative: they screw up our decision making, or undermine our health, wealth, and happiness. However, biases evolved with us, and for good reasons...
It's first and foremost a heuristic -- a reasonably good way to generate good behavior. Secondarily, in certain specific situations, it causes non-optimal behavior.
[1] ( https://www.amazon.com/Heuristics-Biases-Psychology-Intuitiv... )
A critic of the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Gigerenzer argues that heuristics should not lead us to conceive of human thinking as riddled with irrational cognitive biases, but rather to conceive rationality as an adaptive tool that is not identical to the rules of formal logic or the probability calculus. He and his collaborators have theoretically and experimentally shown that many so-called cognitive fallacies are better understood as adaptive responses to a world of uncertainty—such as the conjunction fallacy, the base rate fallacy, and overconfidence.[4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerd_Gigerenzer
His books are well worth a read.
Nassim Taleb also has a similar criticism in that he says that Kahneman and Tversky essentially said that humans don't act according to theoretical rules but instead have their own heuristics that have been derived from dealing with an uncertain world throughout history:
https://twitter.com/nntaleb/status/883689826335281153?lang=e...
For the large majority of our history, we've not been rational in the least. HN had a good discussion [0] on the Medieval Mindset [1] earlier in the summer. For ~1000 years in the Medieval period, the main mindsets were not rationality vs. irrationality, right vs. less-wrong vs. wrong, etc. But more Pious vs Impious, Cruel vs Kind, The Ideal vs the Real, etc. The people were no less people, but their heads weren't ours.
What economic theories will come next, what new ways of thinking, what new mindsets? We're so focused on the rational, the 'right' answers, these days. But life, as we all know, is VERY stochastic ( a fancy word for random ). Maybe new mindsets about the randomness, bounded and given standards of deviation, will be a new paradigm, not just in economics, but in everything we do.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17058487
[1] https://coinsandscrolls.blogspot.com/2017/09/thinking-mediev...
Why do people say this. This was never true. The Wealth of Nations is basically a compendium on human behavior, and that was 200 years ago.
For instance, the priming experiments cannot be reproduced.
> This result confirms Kahneman’s prediction that priming research is a train wreck and readers of his book “Thinking Fast and Slow” should not consider the presented studies as scientific evidence that subtle cues in their environment can have strong effects on their behavior outside their awareness.
https://replicationindex.wordpress.com/2017/02/02/reconstruc...
Bernays comes up a lot in counter-cultural circles, but it's always bugged me that I've never seen any validating evidence that his techniques were actually effective, beyond "he came up with the idea of 'freedom torches' and smoking went up among women."
His techniques sound interesting, and they feel like they'd be effective, but I had trouble finding any solid research that validated the idea that his techniques were effective at anything other than making himself famous.
(* Don't get me wrong – I love Curtis's films, as art. But it bugs me how they usually present a flood of information presented as fact, with little to know citation or corroboration. If they were just art, it wouldn't bug me, but a lot of people seem to swallow the films' conclusions wholesale.)
Of course marketing schemes for "act now or lose out" won't work. I don't currently experience the opportunity and therefore losing out exerts no power over me. However, losing a mug when I already own the mug would demand a higher price from me. I would agree with Dr. Thaler that the inertia thing is a minor point about terminology.
Call it loss aversion or call it inertia. Marketing schemes that include the word "loss" in their pitch are not using the same strategy that behavioral economists are talking about here.
Prior to being introduced to behavioral economics my exposure to economics was very quantitative, while this model is necessary it's incomplete. A lot of economics seems to assume that the actors are equally rational beings but in the real world that's just not the case. Behavioral economics seems to bring actual human experience into economics.
Richard Thaler's Misbehaving is a good read on how this developed. I had Thaler as a professor for a couple of classes in the early 80s and I found some of the insights from early-on behavioral economics some of the more useful things I learned in my MBA.
Probably because people got sick of a guy with a formulae lecturing them about how human's aught behave as opposed to developing functional models of how humans do behave
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game
The Nash Equilibrium of this game is to offer the other person $0...unless you incorporate the idea that humans may care about more than pure monetary payoffs in their mental gymnastics.
Kinda like when that friend from undergrad studying business told you that paying anything more your minimum tax bill was 'irrational'
I'm an Economics PhD and former professor and most of the research isn't taken very seriously. Everyone acknowledges that people don't behave "rationally", but no one yet has been able to figure out how to build these behavioral assumptions into a working model that is actionable.
Now we just need a revolution in economics comparable to the cognitive psychology movement that got that field beyond Skinnerian behaviorism.
and in the article: "It reflects the widespread perception that behavioral economics combines the cleverness and fun of pop psychology with the rigor and relevance of economics."
The author is using behavioral economics to argue against behavioral economics.
That is...actually, a good point, and exactly describes something I'd noticed.
One of the problems with economics is the assumption of the "perfectly rational actor", which sometimes leads to economic's descriptive vs. prescriptive issue: someone will create a massively complicated scheme that maximizes some positive value under a certain set of assumptions and then assume that people actually behave like that.
Some of what I've read, including by Richard Thaler, who I otherwise rather like, buys into that scenario, saying "no, this is what they do; they behave irrationally". Sure, people aren't by any means perfectly rational, but it's not irrational to not perform a complicated maneuver that's only useful in a specific, odd, circumstance.
There's another interesting bit from the article:
"[In the class mug experiment showing "loss aversion,"] the participants may not have had a clearly defined idea of what the mug was worth to them. If that was the case, there was a range of prices for the mug ($4 to $6) that left the participants disinclined to either buy or sell it, and therefore mug owners and non-owners maintained the status quo out of inertia. Only a relatively high price ($7 and up) offered a meaningful incentive for an owner to bother parting with the mug; correspondingly, only a relatively low price ($3 or below) offered a meaningful incentive for a non-owner to bother acquiring the mug.
"In experiments of our own, we were able to tease apart these two alternatives, and we found that the evidence was more consistent with the “inertia” explanation. Dr. Thaler has dismissed our argument as a “minor point about terminology,” since the deviant behaviors attributed to loss aversion occur regardless of the cause. But a different account for why a behavior occurs is not a minor terminological difference; it is a major explanatory difference. Only if we understand why a behavior occurs can we create generalizable knowledge, the goal of science."
"The deviant behaviors attributed to loss aversion?" Not only is there nothing deviant about the behavior, it's not in any sense "loss aversion". In fact, it's perfectly rational, given limited rationality resources, not to engage the whole engine in an otherwise minor scenario.
>In this respect, behavioural economics can be thought of as endorsing the outsize benefits of psychological “tricks,”...
But it also covers bubbles and crashes which have major effects in the billions/trillons financially and with millions having their jobs and housing effected. It would seem sensible to take that stuff seriously.
In the book, Thaler describes nudges such as placing the fresh fruit in the school lunch line in a more easily reachable location than the junk food. The idea is that kids will be more inclined to choose a piece of fresh fruit if it's in easy reach but the chocolate bar requires bending down, etc.
While such nudges may sometimes be measurably effective, we must also realize that the idea of socially beneficial nudges evokes a sort of utopian paternalism.
The idea behind Nudge paints the picture that there is a light-weight, unobtrusive version of central planning (or central nudging) that can achieve some of the utopian outcomes that planners wish for, but which is less encroaching upon individual freedom.
At what point do situational nudges start to feel like social nudges? What if the chubby kid who wants the chocolate has to humiliate himself by reaching far overhead and fishing around blindly in an out-of-reach bin to find the chocolate while everyone else waits impatiently?
When does spending hours to opt out of helpful services become an inappropriate encumberment?
Google just launched sentence completion in gmail. Combine this with nudges and fuck you won't be corrected to duck you, the typist will see an autocompleted hey I'm feeling really frustrated about what you said right now ready to accept with the tap of a single button.
Nudges are meant as a mechanism of social control. Gal points out wisely that if we rush to judgment about the why of behaviors, then our behavioral economic remedies (nudges, etc.) might be terribly wrongheaded.
> All of them continue to do great object-level work in their respective fields, but it seems like the “moment” for books about rationality came and passed around 2010. Maybe it’s because the relevant science has slowed down – who is doing Kahneman-level work anymore? Maybe it’s because people spent about eight years seeing if knowing about cognitive biases made them more successful at anything, noticed it didn’t, and stopped caring.
[1] http://slatestarcodex.com/2018/09/19/book-review-the-black-s...