>every single one of them said no. The executive said yes to NASA.
what was the communication issue here, besides the obvious "the executive is deaf"?
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The standard procedure invented by management(mostly as a 'cya' tactic) is this. They can never be wrong. Like never. Your bosses are never wrong. No matter how effectively you communicate with them to convince them to arrive at different decisions.
From Shuttle disasters to Diesel scandals to Data breaches.
The obvious solution to this is by blaming engineers. Engineers must try harder. If the management still doesn't agree, well then you are not trying hard enough. Remember the rule, they are never wrong, if you fail to convince them its your mistake because you didn't convince them otherwise.
Hence a 'Communication problem'. Which implies management is mostly innocent, and engineering didn't do its job well enough.
This absurd rule exists for a simple reason.
Who is supposed to audit these disasters and arrive at a root cause?
Answer: Management.
Which is where "managing up" comes in. Want your manager to change their mind and do the right thing? Find a way to package the right thing so they can do it without having to admit they were wrong.
(Yes I know, it's awful that people have to do this, in a perfect world things like this would be unnecessary, etc. When you find a perfect world, call me, I would like to buy some real estate.)
>>Find a way to package the right thing so they can do it without having to admit they were wrong.
Please note that this scenario would arise only after the disaster happens. These people have to make a decision before that. There is no concept of a blame before a disaster, only accountability. For a simple reason that it has not happened yet.
Now if a room full of engineers said NO in consensus, and you still go ahead and say YES. Then you either know something they don't which in case you must mention what that information is, and get it reviewed from those engineers who don't have that information. Then vote again, make the YES/NO decision appropriately. Repeat until there is consensus between both you and them. If not take complete responsibility for making that decision, because only you know why you are making that decision.
Decisions this crucial are not left to gut feeling and Rambo level on-the-field thinking. There is a reason you have a panel of experts/engineers sitting.
You don't make any decisions in reality. You only iterate the process of arriving at YES/NO once all the data and scenarios are reviewed.
Situations like these happens when managers/administrators think they are kings with veto to override decisions at whim.
Even at the very highest levels. Including that of Prime Ministers and Presidents, governments are largely run by expert panels and commissions, with politicians only give policy directions. And manage things based on recommendations.
Just to play Devil's advocate: The answer a bunch of engineers will give to "is it safe to launch?" is always some variant of "no, not completely".
The executive needs to be able to determine if the current "no" is "more no" than the usual "no". That might not exactly be straightforward depending on how dysfunctional the relationship between management and engineers had become.
These were engineers, not lawyers. Engineers understand what an acceptable margin of error or failure is, and whether that line has been crossed. In this case, they answered "no" because they felt the defined threshold for safety of the O rings had been exceeded, and the risk was now unacceptable.
In contrast, lawyers freely play with words as if they have no meaning, because they will claim, "In our legal system, justice is the responsibility of the jury. We lawyers merely serve as opposing advocates. Thus we are obliged to confuse and mislead the jury toward our desired ends, using whatever verbiage / argument best serves our client."
That's why I'm an engineer.
Full traceability would be a good start.
When they see the actual engineers' answers of "NO" on the traceability report, then NASA would have stopped right there as a blocker and push hard.
Having execs make engineering safety critical decisions is a way to kill people. And hopefully now NASA forces this on all their contraters and internal staff.
> When they see the actual engineers' answers of "NO" on the traceability report, then NASA would have stopped right there as a blocker and push hard.
This is completely unsupported by the extensive investigation and reports of the catastrophe. NASA simply would not accept NO, and all evidence available says they would have found a way to justify ignoring any weather + seals evidence that would have stopped the launch.
Consider anther point if view: This engineering firm has taken hundreds of millions of dollars from NASA, and are now guaranteeing to a man that their product is dangerous and unsuitable for its task.
Were the safe conditions for use specified in the contract? Or was the breakdown in communication long before the launch day? NASA expecting an all weather booster, and the engineering firm producing a booster which would be unsafe in freezing conditions?