If you believe that the Torah is the literal and infallible word of god, then any apparent loopholes must be intentional - indeed, to believe otherwise would be tantamount to blasphemy. Who are you to try and second-guess God's intentions when his words are right there in black and white?
Personally, I find these creative interpretations of Jewish religious law to be an endless source of fascination. It speaks to a vibrant, conscious engagement with religious practice rather than the mindless observation of old rites. It might seem weird, but there's absolutely nothing careless or half-assed about it. The immense scholarly effort to figure out whether (for instance) an electric shaver is kosher is itself an act of deep religious devotion.
https://library.yctorah.org/2018/05/is-my-electric-shaver-ko...
1) everything, even apparent loopholes, must be included intentionally, and 2) these laws must be formulated in a way that's flexible enough to conform to changing realities, while sturdy enough not to devolve into ambiguity.
The case of the Eruv offers an example of exactly that.
You're right, that the original commandment, as stated, is pretty clear. Carrying outside of (or between) private residences on the Sabbath is prohibited.
The Sabbath is meant to be a day of rest, so the restriction on carrying things to and from anywhere outside of your home would all but force families to stay in-doors, with each other.
BUT... if the demands or realities of a different (i.e. less than ideal) time were to change so that such an arrangement placed too onerous a burden on worshipers, then the law has an escape clause.
Through the incredibly meticulous and tedious construction of a sprawling boundary, any space could become technically "private."
The rationalization would be that though this was a loophole, the sheer difficulty of exploiting it would signal that practitioners of the Sabbath (and especially the Rabbinic authorities needed to approve and supervise an Eruv) literally had no other option than to sidestep the commandment as originally intended.
It's worth noting that relatively few Jewish laws have such escape clauses.
The thinking is that it signals only those laws for which ideal circumstances are required to actually observe them. To be clear, the original commandment always holds (because even when you do construct an Eruv, let's say, you still must have the original commandment in mind), but there is a threshold after which observing this stricture in a surrogate manner is deemed acceptable.
That turned out way longer than I expected...
In fact, some of the controversy around building Eruvin in large cities like Manhattan is that large cities may have certain features that make them a public domain according to the biblical prohibition, thus making an Eruv of this kind impossible.
"In frustration, Rabbi Eliezer finally cries out, "If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it." From Heaven a voice is heard, saying, "Why are you differing with Rabbi Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion?" Rabbi Joshua responds, "It [the Torah] is not in heaven" (Deuteronomy 30:12). He responds in this way because the Torah, which was given by God to mankind at Sinai, specifically instructs those who follow it that they are to look to the received Torah as their source and guide. The Torah says, "It is not in heaven, that you should say, 'Who will go up to heaven for us, and get it for us so that we may hear it and observe it?' Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, 'Who will cross to the other side of the sea for us, and get it for us so that we may hear it and observe it?' No, the word is very near to you; it is in your mouth and in your heart for you to observe" (Deuteronomy 30:12-14).
Rabbi Joshua's response then expresses the view that the work of law is a work of human activity, and that the Torah itself supports this legal theory. The Torah is not a document of mystery which must have its innate meaning revealed by a minority, but it is instead a document from which law must be created through the human activity of debate and consensus. Rabbinic literature was capable of recognizing differing opinions as having a degree of legitimacy (Yer. Ber. 3b), yet the community remains united and the ruling which is ultimately followed comes through proper jurisprudence. As such, Rabbi Eliezer's miraculous appeals represent a differing legal theory and were outside of proper jurisprudence which meant that they would not be followed. Instead the Jewish community followed the ruling of the majority in this issue and in others. The Talmud asks how God responded to this incident. We are told that upon hearing Rabbi Joshua's response, God smiled and stated, "My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me.""
Maybe, I'm not an expert in Judaism, but this comparison with that description:
> it's like the [...] Catholic papal infallibility doctrine
...shows a deep failure to understand the doctrine of papal infallibility, and makes me suspect the characterization of the Jewish understanding is equally flawed.
Compare "It is not in heaven" with ""Whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven."
No, it doesn't. Either in theory (where the direction of effect is the reverse described and there is no retroactivity) or in practice (where the theoretical restrictions on the applicability of the doctrine mean that on any issue where there is otherwise any controversy, the doctrine doesn't force a resolution it just expands the debate to include whether any papal statements ever made on the issue met the criteria for infallibility.)
> Compare "It is not in heaven" with ""Whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven."
The latter isn't related to the basis for the doctrine of infallibility (whether papal or ecclesiastical) but it is part of the basis of doctrine around the priestly role in confession.
And yes retroactively - "You bind on earth" is present tense, "will be bound in heaven" is future tense - unless this is a translation artifact there is a clear causal ordering specified here.
Yes, and it refers not to changing what God wanted in the past (which would be retroactive, but isn't what a present tense action having future tense effects would indicate; it's not “whatever you bind on Earth will have been bound in Heaven”, which would plausibly describe a retroactive effect, or alternatively or pre-ordained one) but the future consequences of sin. Again, the quote you point to is the basis for doctrine about absolution of sin in confession, not the ecclesiastical infallibility either in general or in the specific form of papal infallibility, which are not closely related doctrines.