If a field of knowledge is associated with a person or group of persons ("Frankfurter Schule", "Wiener Kreis"), I am a priori sceptical. Genuine scientific knowledge exists for itself and does not require authority and sectarian admiration. Philosophy can produce more useful things (e.g. knowledge representation, ontologies) than subjective individual opinions.
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So how do you feel about Newtonian physics or algorithms? All knowledge is social.
Expressing opinions does not create new, reliable scientific knowledge. Instead scientists observe, make claims, deduce the effects of their claims, and then conduct experiments suited to possibly observe these effects. So it's not just claiming. And the laws of physics exist by themselves, even when there is no human society to discover and know them.
It's a different story how knowledge is passed on or accepted by society.
We know that the proof of authority is the weakest and most unreliable type of evidence. But still the proof of authority dominates in practical everyday life. We believe things because our parents or teachers tell us, even if we had the possibility to check them ourselves from a scientific point of view. But parents and teachers are not the source of knowledge, they are only transmitters.
In the humanities ("Geisteswissenschaften", and similar disciplines) the situation is different. Knowledge is rather believable and not falsifiable, but only accepted on the authority of the person who uttered the sentence.
>In the humanities ("Geisteswissenschaften", and similar disciplines) the situation is different. Knowledge is rather believable and not falsifiable, but only accepted on the authority of the person who uttered the sentence.
I'm curious if you have any evidence that this is a general trend. Your original comment is also wrong; the "Frankfurt School", one of your examples, does not ascribe particular authority to its members by virtue of being part of the "school"[1] - rather, it denotes a particular tradition, very similar to the way we use the term "school" in music. A school of thought[0] specifically denotes a commitment to a particular method or set of principles, not a commitment to certain personages. Although a school may take after one person, it's not because of the person but because of the content of their thought.
Besides, the Frankfurt School never claimed to be carrying out science. Other schools were, for instance, committed to certain ideas of science. These philosophical schools are ontologically prior to science.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/School_of_thought
[1] Habermas is a "member" of the Frankfurt School of thought, yet he is criticized by those inside and outside the school. This, at least, shows that a school of thought is not a dogmatic adherence to a person or their ideas.
As with all mathematics, this is acceptable because it's named after the wrong person; in this case, the foundational work named after Newton was first exhibited by Kepler. I do sometimes hear the phrase "Keplerian element" when talking about classical orbits, named after Kepler and not Galileo.
Interesting point, but not actually a rebuttal of my statement. Another example: von Neumann Architecture was not invented by von Neumann; he was just the guy who illegally published the concept under his name without naming the real authors. So again: attributing knowledge to persons does not really help.
Newtonian physics is a great example, because Newtonian physics is wrong! Due to relativity and quantum mechanics. If it were still our best guess at how the world worked, I think we would just call it "physics" rather than "Newtonian physics".
"Science isn't useful because it is right, science is right because it is useful." (Unknown philosopher of science, possibly but probably not Feyerabend)
From this perspective, there's nothing "wrong" with Newtonian physics as long as you understand the domain in which it is useful (essentially: larger than molecules, smaller than planets).
Newtonian physics, QM and relativity are all just stories we tell in our attempt to understand how the universe came to be as it is, and predict how it will change (with or without our own actions). They are all "wrong" in the sense that none of them are the way the universe actually is, but they are all "right" in the sense that they provide us with immense explanatory and predictive power when used in the appropriate domain(s).
"All models are wrong. Some are useful."
Is quantum mechanics wrong because it's not called "mechanics"?
Is Minkowski space wrong because it's not called space?
I agreed with you sort of. But as there was originally a positive view ie “For Method” not just against one in the book, may I try the problem presented by Kuhn. All institutions have built in bias. And teacher found their own similar once. Hence the paradigm. And the authority is there.
also even if there is no authority one still has to explain what we are doing here. Philosophy may not just be of philosopher. We are not Plato and Aristotle... and in fact I doubt many practitioner even listen to this speculation. but still they need to say something.
For example One may say we are trying to devise experiments to refute ... or is it really so? that is not we observe but to a certain extent per Kuhn I say not. And this popper Way and the anarchist way is just was to take about things.
Historical schools were very much a product of the era where communication was difficult, so it was natural for people to be most influenced by the people around them, particularly when people write mostly in their national languages. Some of these schools had considerable momentum, so that they persisted into the post-war era outside their original milieu (Austrian economics, say, or the Frankfurt School), but it's not something you see much of anymore.