By the end of the day, "philosopher" is nothing more than a more fashionable word for "writer". And like "film critic", "philosopher" is an unprotected, self-appointed title. In principle, philosophers (apart from having to compete for an audience like writers) have a pretty simple life. They can simply claim something without ever providing any proof. And with a bit of luck and charisma, they find disciples who continue to represent their doctrine and help their master to gain social prestige. And as you correctly say: this concept predates science and enlightenment.
My original statement was that I am skeptical of knowledge whose origins are a specific person or group of persons ("schools"). I hope to have clarified my point after this excursion. In the case of traditional philosophy of science there is even a contradiction in terms: the statements are dogmas that defy falsification. So according to the own criteria of the philosophy of science of that time they do not differ from religion.
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>By the end of the day, "philosopher" is nothing more than a more fashionable word for "writer". And like "film critic", "philosopher" is an unprotected, self-appointed title.
Scientists also write; writing isn't the point, the point is logically consistent arguments (or arguments for a particular logical system), which philosophers attempt to make. "Mathematician", "programmer", "logician" and in many cases "engineer" are also self-appointed titles, yet in both cases we must say that a mathematician and engineer's work could reasonably be said to be confined to writing and designing. The fact of the matter is that logical claims do not require "proof", but the relevance of theories to the world as observed by science does require support from the scientific method. This is why philosophers strive for their systems to be consistent with the current state of science (whether physics, biology or sociology, etc.)
>And as you correctly say: this concept predates science and enlightenment.
It not only predates, it is ontologically prior, meaning that for science to be carried out, there must be a justified philosophy of science for it to have any basis. For instance, we might ask, "why falsification?" - a question that, if unanswered, renders science without a logical basis. You may reply that science is useful whether or not we have a logical basis, but usefulness in turn requires some justification; after all, many things are useful but we do not carry them out for other reasons.
>In the case of traditional philosophy of science there is even a contradiction in terms: the statements are dogmas that defy falsification
This is not a contradiction in terms, since most philosophers of science are not pure falsificationists. Falsification is not the only way to gain knowledge generally (logical arguments and mathematics are unfalsifiable; even the statement "science must be falsifiable" is unfalsifiable), but after Popper there are very few pure falsificationists in the philosophy of science, for various good reasons[0].
>So according to the own criteria of the philosophy of science of that time they do not differ from religion.
Philosophy of science is very much the equivalent of atheism, or agnosticism when we're talking about dogmas such as falsificationism or positivism or any other popular way of doing science that is unjustified.
I can't really add more than I already said. I assume that you know the difference between physicists, mathematicians and engineers or how these titles are protected in Germany, for example, and that there is no need to discuss this. I have already referred (see links above) to the direction in which, in my view, the philosophy of science should usefully develop. And regardless how you call it: hypothesis, prediction and experiment are still the essential steps of todays generally accepted scientific method.