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Wow, this article seems oddly detailed regarding CIA structure? It was an interesting read.

So, this disaster (back in 2008) basically made underwater ROVs look like the answer everyone could have guessed they were. Incompetent management at SAD (SAC) (lol?) basically did their/his incompetent job by forcing unprepared staff into the middle of a tropical storm, where they sadly disappeared, and thus helped ensure that humans were further distanced from missions with such parameters in the future.

> Deployed from the small ship, the two divers would emplace a “pod” disguised as a rock and stuffed with classified technology just beneath the surface of the waves. It would then passively monitor electronic signals of Chinese naval ships.

OK, so it's just about placing a device on one island.

> The mission wasn’t just about placing a device on one island, it was a proof of concept that would demonstrate the continued relevance of the CIA’s Maritime Branch.

...but the mission to place the device on one island _was_ where all these hopes had been pinned? This part wasn't super clear. But yikes if so.

> The CIA’s Maritime Branch was essentially in competition with the Navy, and this mission would help prove its worth.

Phew. I don't envy them this position. SAD (SAC) is like an entire armed forces structure on its own. It's probably easy for the Navy to laugh and claim redundancy. Though looking back to e.g. Vietnam, the deniability for the USG may seem worth the exchange for a little bit of annoying overlap.

I do wonder if people in CIG think they belong in a different organizational structure entirely...imagine running disinformation and propaganda, largely mental games compared to the very physical SOG, fully laden with Delta, SEALs, Russian helicopters, etc.