The myth of the Spitfire is over-hyped because it's a lot simpler than the reality of the situation.
Not just shot-down pilots: a battle-damaged British plane had a good chance of limping back to a safe landing (at an airstrip or even a country road), while a battle-damaged German plane had much lower chances of lasting long enough to land in German territory. Even when British planes were completely shot down, the wreckage could often be recovered and used for spare parts.
The "Cactus Air Force" on Guadalcanal had similar advantages.
>Finally, unlike the Lufwaffe, the RAF had the world's first integrated air defense network, with radar pickets to detect inbound bombers, control centres to direct the interceptors, and radio-directed fighters.
People usually understand the more immediate advantages of this system ("get the jump on the enemy," etc.), but often miss the deeper implication: this was, if you'll pardon the use of a buzz-word, a true force multiplier. If they had not had their IADS, the British would have been forced to fly constant patrols all along their coastline, spreading themselves thin in an attempt to catch all of the incoming German forces. At the tactical level, their formations would have been outnumbered in most cases. At the strategic level, their crews and planes would have been worn out from ceaseless flying. Instead, they were able to keep most of their planes on the ground, with well-rested alert crews standing by, then concentrate large numbers of planes exactly where they were needed at exactly the right time.
The entire Battle of Britain was a grievous strategic error by Goering.
If you look at what Germany was trying to do - invade the UK - then the only real course of action for them was to indeed launch the Battle of Britain. They had momentum, they were pressing the attack.
While true that the Luftwaffe didn't have exactly the right equipment for a strategic bombing war (nobody did, actually, it wasn't perfected until the allies needed to do it), you're playing too much of a Monday Morning Quarterback blaming Goering.
Strategically, the only mistake the Germans made during BB was to switch from targeting tactical targets to bombing cities. It's doubtful though if this really made much of a difference in the end.
Fundamentally though, there was nothing overly wrong with the German approach to the BB. It was a tough assignment that they perhaps were a little overconfident in being able to pull off, but in the end, they just lost.
The hurricane was also cheaper to make and easier to repair than the spitfire because of its wire and canvas construction.
Even A-bomb, if obtained by Hitler wouldn't win the war for him. Though, the losses of the anti-Hitler coalition would be much larger (on the scale of 5-20K military personnel / per bomb)
Hence the German pilots (against their better instincts) started shooting pilots who had bailed out. This was seen as "bad form" by both sides but the Germans knew that a British pilot who survived could be back in the air causing more problems for them later the same day.
As the war progressed, Britain imported fuel with better and better quality, and had increasing horsepower, wheras the Germans supplies were limited and worsening.
The RAF was structured so that pilots trained in the quiet northern zones, flew in the south for battle, then rotated through the quiet north for recouperation, the Germans flew their pilots into battle pretty much constantly, including new pilots.
The British had airfields without concrete runways, so the German attack plan of bombing airfields out of action was useless - levelling the ground meant the airfield was back in action in a few hours.
Briton had very high priority for aircraft repair, planes could arrive damaged, and be flying again the next day.
These are all things I recall hearing on a recent TV show about the air-war of the time. German aircraft had more ammunition, better ammunition, and there was a big difference in numbers of planes, but their strategy, situation and luck was worse in too many ways.
It's main opponent -- the Bf109 -- had racing heritage as well, in form of Bf108.
Supermarine's racing planes were built on contracts from Royal government, so the company had experience in working for this kind of customer.
Curiously enough, one weak point of the Spitfire -- the narrow undercarriage -- was something with which the team had less experience, as the S.4, .5, .6, .6B were all floatplanes.
So yes, innovation all the way, but built upon solid experience (cue the proverbial shoulders of giants ;-) )
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There are many other reasons why Britain was never invaded in 1940: the Dunkirk evacuation saving the trained part of the army, the extensive early warning system, including radars, the preliminary work on the Enigma machine brought over by escaped Poles etc. Chief among them, I would argue, was the fact that Hitler didn't really want to fight the British after France fell, and didn't expect he would have to. The lack of investment in submarines and strategic bombers, the half-hearted and late starting planning for Sea Lion, the minimal commitment to the Mediterranean front (North Africa, Malta, Gibraltar) etc. only make sense in this light. The fact that, with proper planning and resources allocated, the German military was more than capable of taking on the British in an across-the-water operation was proven earlier in the same year by the successful operation in Norway, and next year by the capture of Crete.
If the entire RAF had been equipped with Hurricanes, and not a single Spitfire seen combat until the fall, the result would have been exactly the same.
The UK had numerous advantages over the Germans during this battle. All of them combined to create the outcome we now know as history.
Look at fusion research: can we say even now which of tokamaks, laser inertial confinement, Focus, Polywell, magnetized target fusion, sonofusion, and even cold fusion is likeliest to produce results? I know lots of people have opinions, but the fact is, we don't know. And yet look at the funding profile: we've placed a huge bet on ITER, a smaller one on NIH, and by comparison, practically nothing on any of the others. This is not the right way to do basic research -- particularly not when it's this important.
As a product of the '30's, it was quite a piece of work. Along with the Zero, the best pre-war fighters out there.
If seen the ones on display in Seattle, but I can't recall if I've seen one fly (went to a lot of air shows as a kid).
I got a ride in the back seat of a P-51 a few years ago. That was a totally awesome experience. I was given a parachute, and told by the pilot "if you see me climbing out, you'd better get out, too."
(And there's a Lancaster Bomber Flyby in the English Midlands this Sunday, incidentally).
The sound of 50 lancs flying towards you at 20000 feet must have sounded like death approaching.