This _is_ a user privacy feature. It's clearly a precursor to E2EE iCloud services they weren't able to provide before.
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I fail to see how scanning my photos on my device is a win for privacy. What’s the point of E2E encryption if there’s access to the device? E2EE is meaningless in the presence of this backdoor.
The CSAM scanning system Apple describes prevents[0] the sort of abuse that has historically been used as as argument against convenient strong encryption. By casting a very specific net for the most egregious abuse, they defuse the strongest political argument against E2EE while remaining compatible with a strong E2EE system. Read the docs upthread - they go to lengths to cryptographically enforce the topline privacy guarantees. Client side scanning of iCloud-destined photos is a net-zero change, since they’re already doing this server side. Scanning plus future E2EE is a strict improvement in privacy for iCloud users.
If you're concerned about ways Apple might access on-device contents in the future ... there's myriad ways for your OS vendor to circumvent the privacy protections offered by your OS ...
[0] or is at least as comprehensive a mitigation as possible on systems with access to cleartext