That last sentence suggests intrinsic motivation. Sometimes there may also be a business motivation (e.g., economics of the infotainment industry).
People share things they like and agree with, but they also share things that piss them off and make them mad.
"From the start of this book I have had occasion, in various contexts, to refer to the overwhelming elation felt by scientists at the moment of discovery, an elation of a kind which only a scientist can feel and which science alone can evoke in him. In the very first chapter I quoted the famous passage in which Kepler announced the discovery of his Third Law: ‘...nothing holds me; I will indulge my sacred fury...’1 The outbreak of such emotions in the course of discovery is well known, but they are not thought to affect the outcome of discovery. Science is regarded as objectively established in spite of its passionate origins. It should be clear by this time that I dissent from that belief; and I have now come to the point at which I want to deal explicitly with passions in science. I want to show that scientific passions are no mere psychological by-product, but have a logical function which contributes an indispensable element to science. They respond to an essential quality in a scientific statement and may accordingly be said to be right or wrong, depending on whether we acknowledge or deny the presence of that quality in it."
--- Michael Polanyi
--- Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, p140
Hey wait a minute, I still want to look at truly scientific notebooks before they get thrown out.
To me it seems clear that the word "science" and the outer trappings and forms of using the Scientific Method have become co-opted, largely in the last century or so, to cover a lot of things that just can't be considered "true science". This is not a "No True Scotsman" instance, because there is a clear and incontrovertible guideline for what (I think) counts as "true" science: the ability to make accurate predictions. That, and that alone, is what truly distinguishes science (as I am using the term here, in a restricted sense) from all the other what-could-be-called "predictive arts": e.g. astrology, tarot & divination, numerology, etc.
Obviously, physics counts as "true" science. The standard model makes predictions accurate to within a mind-bending tolerance, the width of a human hair over the distance from New York to Los Angeles. Chemistry is science, biochemistry and molecular biology are still science. Biology and ecology are pretty scientific. From there, things get much worse pretty quickly.
By the standard of "ability to make accurate predictions" there are a lot of things we call "science" today that I just don't think deserve the title, most importantly: economics, sociology, and psychology. They can't make predictions, and in many cases they can't even replicate their "findings" from previous "research"!
I think those "sciences" serve a social function, the same one that the court astrologers et. al. used to serve, they give a glamour of legitimacy to the king and a way to deflect responsibility onto councilors of the imaginary, who supply ready-made scapegoats.
I'm not saying "the humanities are not useful" or anything like that, what I'm saying is that people mix up the orders of knowledge (deliberately or otherwise) as part of politics, and that some things that we call "science" today, aren't. I mean, E=mc2 doesn't have to "defend itself" politically. Anyone anywhere can test it for themselves (that's the whole point, innit!?)
Sociology and psychology do make predictions, but do not have good accuracy and experiments are often prohibitively expensive or difficult to run[0]. Nonetheless, they seek to refine them based on new findings and new methods, and I think it's uncontroversial that psychology today has a body of knowledge it can make predictions about better than 50 years ago, at which point it had a body larger and more clearly defined than 100 years ago, etc.. This is not true of numerology, tarot, etc., as well as less controversial non-sciences like painting or rhetoric. It also helps tease out the scientific vs. non-scientific (without value judgement) parts of e.g. economics, and the scientific vs. non-scientific parts of physics.
Focusing the definition on outcomes rather than methods repeats the same original sin of scientism you're criticizing. (Plus it means a particularly lucky coin could safely be 'science'.)
[0] Also true of large areas of modern physics.
Do you mean the "open-world" vs. "closed-world" assumptions?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_world_assumption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed-world_assumption
> Sociology and psychology do make predictions...
Like what? I don't mean to sound rude or combative, I really want to know what you're thinking of here.
FWIW if economics, sociology and psychology were classified as "non-sciences like painting or rhetoric" I would retire my objections. I don't think the problem is that these are pre-scientific fields that will become more predictive, I think it is that they have been derailed from the (natural?) progression of scientific knowledge from descriptive to ordering to predictive (e.g. like alchemy becoming chemistry.)
To give you one example of predictions in psychology: Pavlov made very clear (and accurate) predictions about what is going to happen to his dog after "training" it.
On the other hand there are areas in the "hard science", for example physics that have been going for long time, without making any predictions that are testable. String theory is the canonical example here.
So saying only the "hard sciences" are "real sciences" is just repeating the trope that is very popular in engineering cycles (in my experience much less so amongst physicists or chemist). It doesn't make it true. Also it's very difficult to say what you mean by predictions. For example complex systems theory can make accurate predictions about general behavior of a system, but can't predict
> I generally agree with you that all science should be testable, i.e. it should give us tell us things that we did not know, but can then test. However, I don't agree that you can easily extrapolate from that to saying these fields are science and these are not.
I'm talking about this in the context of the political power of science, or more precisely what gets called "science" and why. Coming out of WWII that power derived largely from the very literal power of the mechanized scientific war machine and its ultimate expression in the atom bomb. Not to repeat myself but E=mc² has nothing to prove, what political power physicists hold derives from the universality of their domain of knowledge. Anyone anywhere can test the formula by testing its predictions.
> Psychology, economics etc. do make predictions and many have been tested.
Not to the degree that we can rely on them for large-scale policy decisions, though? I mean the guy who runs the Federal Reserve is on record saying he doesn't know what he's doing, eh?
In re: Pavlov, I don't know how to respond. Behaviorism as an example of successful scientific psychology seems... I dunno... counterproductive?
> String theory is the canonical example here.
String theory isn't science. String theorists should be embarrassed to call what they do "physics" and they should admit that they're actually mathematicians. There's no shame in that, is there?
Anhow, to get back to my main point, I don't really have a problem with people wanting to call what they do "science" until we get to the point when they want to wield political power. To caricature what I mean: I don't think it's valid to say "I'm a scientist therefore believe me." if you can't make solid dependable predictions about it (whatever it is that you're trying to get people to believe.) If you're able to say, truthfully, "I can make predictions that you can rely on, and I can also teach you how to make the same predictions using the same data and methods so you don't have to take my word for it." then not only is that proper science (in my view) but it's also unimpeachable in the realm of political power.
Who are you talking about and what did they actually say?
Inflation rate targeting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation_targeting has been a huge success for classical economics. Various countries announced they were going to use it to control inflation and have managed to keep it in 2%ish bands over the past 30 years.
However, it's not a complete control system and it's still vulnerable to fiscal and exogenous shocks like "a pandemic" and "a war with one of the major fossil fuel producers of the world".
Greenspan. Some quotes here: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/24/economics-c...
> The former Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, has conceded that the global financial crisis has exposed a "mistake" in the free market ideology which guided his 18-year stewardship of US monetary policy.
> A long-time cheerleader for deregulation, Greenspan admitted to a congressional committee yesterday that he had been "partially wrong" in his hands-off approach towards the banking industry and that the credit crunch had left him in a state of shocked disbelief. "I have found a flaw," said Greenspan, referring to his economic philosophy. "I don't know how significant or permanent it is. But I have been very distressed by that fact."
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In re: Inflation rate targeting, I'm not educated enough in economics (I think it's kooky, eh?) to have an informed opinion. If it's been working for thirty years, great. That's about how long it's been since I examined and dismissed economic "science" as a snotty teenager, so maybe I'm just ignorant.
Here's a fun thing:
> Professor Charles Goodhart, a Pacemaker.Global Advisor, professor emeritus at the LSE and former member of the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee, made a rather remarkable statement at the ECB Forum on Central Banking 2021 last month: “the world at the moment is in a really a rather extraordinary state because we have no general theory of inflation”
https://www.pacemaker.global/post/goodhart-we-have-no-genera...
This very much seems like you're confusing stochastic or systemic uncertainty in a domain (which might be the same thing, information-theoretically) with uncertainty due to the representations or models of a field.
There's limits to the predictability of all phenomena. That doesn't mean there isn't some predictability, or that it's not worth achieving those limits.
I don't fully understand that sentence, but you're speaking my language.
> There's limits to the predictability of all phenomena. That doesn't mean there isn't some predictability, or that it's not worth achieving those limits.
Oh absolutely! I'm not arguing against gaining knowledge. I'm saying that we should reserve the name "science" for when those limits are well-established, when the predictions can be used reliably. Really, it doesn't matter so much what you call it up until the point when you're trying to sway public opinion or policy. The political power of science flows from its power of prediction and the universality and impartiality of its knowledge.
No, I don't mean anything so formal. We're humans talking about human activity, not proof systems.
I'm not discussing further since you seem to believe psychology has never made a correct prediction. There's entire areas of the brain named after psychologists who correctly identified their function. Pavlov's dogs are a western cultural touchstone.
> derailed from the (natural?) progression of scientific knowledge
How can you make any claim to define science with such utter teleological nonsense?
I just didn't understand what you meant. I still don't.
> We're humans talking about human activity, not proof systems.
Are you saying that we're talking about something other than proof systems, or are you saying that "we ourselves are not proof systems"? Either way I don't understand. Are you saying that formal logic isn't useful for reasoning about "human activity"?
> I'm not discussing further
Ah, well, nevermind then.
Seriously though, I didn't mean to derail conversation, I was and still am genuinely interested in what you were saying. I can be pretty slow on the uptake sometimes, so please don't take my lack of understanding as criticism of you or what you were saying.
> you seem to believe psychology has never made a correct prediction.
I never said that nor would I. The word "psychology" has a broad range, everything from Freud and Jung to the molecular biology of nerves and neurons, from philosophy to quantum physics. Painting and rhetoric could even be considered to come under the rubric of human psychology. I have my own beliefs about various aspects and components of (some) of all that, but I'm asking you about yours.
> There's entire areas of the brain named after psychologists who correctly identified their function.
Okay, sure, structural neurology has advanced by leaps and bounds (since the bad old days of phrenology) and often informs things like surgical interventions, so that's a kind of scientific knowledge and predictive power. We have leaned much about the anatomy of the brain and how that in turn affect what could be called the anatomy of the mind. I could quibble that that's still pretty close to chemistry and biology which are inside my definition of science, or that it's seldom used to affect political policy, but I'm reminded of the epic battle in re: lead in fuel.
> Pavlov's dogs are a western cultural touchstone.
I don't really know how to respond to this. God save us from policy decided on the basis of Pavlovian psychology?
> > derailed from the (natural?) progression of scientific knowledge
> How can you make any claim to define science with such utter teleological nonsense?
Why do you call that "teleological nonsense"?
I'm not an expert, but my understanding is that science generally starts with describing natural phenomenon, until a large body of reliable facts has accumulated, then a phase of ordering sets in, where the relations between elements are sussed out, which leads to prediction when we know the elements of a system and the rules they obey, and we can predict their behavior and so open the way to engineer new systems (aka "technology"). That's what I meant by the "progression of scientific knowledge". I added the "(natural?)" part because to me that's a interesting and open question. Is there a natural progression to what is, after all, the most artificial of human activities?
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Edit to add: In re: "entire areas of the brain named after psychologists who correctly identified their function."
This just went by on "new links": "Can brain scans reveal behaviour? Bombshell study says not yet"
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30747742 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00767-3
> Brain-imaging data sets had been swelling in size. To show that this growth was making studies more reliable, Marek, based at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri (WashU), and his colleagues split the data in two and ran the same analysis on each subset, expecting the results to match. Instead, they found the opposite. “I was shocked. I thought it was going to look exactly the same in both sets,” says Marek. “I stared out of my apartment window in depression, taking in what it meant for the field.”
> Now, in a bombshell 16 March Nature study1, Marek and his colleagues show that even large brain-imaging studies, such as his, are still too small to reliably detect most links between brain function and behaviour.
> As a result, the conclusions of most published ‘brain-wide association studies’ — typically involving dozens to hundreds of participants — might be wrong. Such studies link variations in brain structure and activity to differences in cognitive ability, mental health and other behavioural traits. For instance, numerous studies have identified brain anatomy or activity patterns that, the studies say, can distinguish people who have been diagnosed with depression from those who have not. Studies also often seek biomarkers for behavioural traits.
> “There’s a lot of investigators who have committed their careers to doing the kind of science that this paper says is basically junk,” says Russell Poldrack, a cognitive neuroscientist at Stanford University in California, who was one of the paper’s peer reviewers. “It really forces a rethink.”
I am not a scientist, but I worked as a R&D engineer and it's my understanding that in a lot of physic fields there is a need for empiric corrections.
It may be the case of semiconductors design if I recall correctly, but it happens also in other fields. Maybe GPS anomalies is a good example:
https://web.stanford.edu/~gracegao/publications/conference/H...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity#Anomalies_and_discrepa...