Freedom to speak and publish, even dangerous ideas, is also a right. Beyond the US.
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True, but (in the US at least), those rights also stop when they come up against an imminent threat. See the trope about falsely yelling “fire” in a crowded movie theater. The issue here seems to be accurately defining that risk.
It's really different IMO.
"Fire!" (falsely) in crowded theatre: Specific. Beneficial outcome unlikely and difficult to even imagine. Harmful outcomes nearly certain.
Powerful AI codebase or service: Generic. Endless beneficial and harmful outcomes easily imagined.
>Powerful AI codebase or service: Generic.
Generic means it can do a nearly unlimited list of things good and bad right?
Just like a human can do a list of nearly unlimited things?
Humans, because they can do both good and bad have laws they must follow if they do bad, right?
Then what are you suggesting for AI?
That's a pretty key difference and a good point. But we still regulate stuff with a similar dichotomy.
Nuclear material can be used to treat cancer. But it can also be used to make weapons. We regulate both.
The "fire in a crowded theater" case was overturned as unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
That’s because the original case was not actually about inciting an imminent threat. It was about speech regarding a war draft. The theater was an analogy in the case opinion.
Limits to speech were sill upheld if that speech could reasonably incite “imminent lawless action”.
Incitement to imminent lawless action[1] was a test applied from 1969 onwards (from Brandenburg v. Ohio[2]), the test used in the case you're referring to (Schenck v. United States (1919)[3]) was that of clear and present danger[4].
> Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes defined the clear and present danger test in 1919 in Schenck v. United States, offering more latitude to Congress for restricting speech in times of war, saying that when words are "of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent....no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
That was ostensibly for sending literature to recently conscripted soldiers suggesting that the draft was a form of involuntary servitude that violated the Thirteenth Amendment.
Whereas, clear and present danger is defined as:
> Advocacy could be punished only "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
That test is basically redrawing the law so it fits, once again, with that of common assault and breach of the peace. Still, I'm not sure what relevance all of this has to the subject at hand, unless we're going to end up at whether something is legal or not or even more absurdly, whether there's a war or not. Those are not very interest nor compelling arguments, especially as there are no such kits yet and no such law regarding the kits (unless we concede that it may well be covered under the 2nd amendment, as it states arms not guns).
[1] https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-i...
[2] https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/189/brandenburg-v-o...
[3] https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/193/schenck-v-unite...
[4] https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-prese...
We seem to be saying the same thing. My previous reply was in response to the statement that the 1919 ruling was overturned. Rather than implying it was completely overturned in 1969, I'm saying that it was upheld in the specific instances where imminent danger is present.
>Still, I'm not sure what relevance all of this has to the subject at hand
The point is rights exist. An to put a limit on a right, you must show a clear and imminent risk. I think you got a little wrapped around the axle on the 2A piece and missed the connection to the article at hand.
When you equivocate code to free speech, there will be people who say certain code is dangerous enough to be limited in that regard. Meaning, a discussion about regulating code is apropos, even though many people will disagree about the threshold of what constitutes a credible risk.
It was clear what your response was about, however it was incorrect. Not only did you provide the wrong test for the wrong cases, cases after that 1919 case used the bad tendency test, up until the 1969 case moved to incitement to imminent lawless action. It's not true to say that anything was upheld due to imminent danger before 1969.
If you're going to correct others for misstating the facts and reasoning of US Supreme Court judgements then I think it only fair that others may do the same to you.