Some might say that confidence created this situation in the first place.
We did not see broad bank runs because confidence in the banking system did not fall. And now we can see why: because the FDIC backstopped depositors.
> "Had depositors lost a SINGLE penny, there would be a very widespread run on bank deposits as people try to get below the $250k figure."
But whether a federal bailout was necessary to avoid that is exactly the question that people have been debating all weekend. It isn't an inarguably factual premise, it's the thing that is being discussed.
For my part, I think that if 1. A private purchaser had been found or 2. A bunch of jackasses with huge social platforms hadn't spent the weekend demanding they be bailed out, then your premise would have been false.
Both of those different outcomes was plausible on Friday. But in the universe that actually played out, I tend to agree that the bailout ended up being necessary.
But I still think it's bad that it was. And not just bad for everyone else, bad for us, here, many of whose livelihoods depend on the continued thriving of an industry that has sadly just demonstrated itself to be (to borrow a word) inept and unworthy of sympathy.
They could increase the FDIC coverage limit to a level that would avert a run, shoring up public confidence in other U.S. banks.
The BTFP if I'm reading this correctly values assets at par instead of face which is wild. It's not just providing liquidity to banks but rather giving them free money.
What Yellen has done now is redefine "bank that poses systemic risk" to mean "any bank at all", which in turn shows that the insurance limit was never real, and that in turn the winners of the system are those who don't believe in the rules, but rather those who gamble on duplicity and the socialist leanings of government employees. Those who tried to believe in the honesty of the system got burned, again, and those who bet on it being meaningless won, again. The long term consequences are fearful.
Your claim that "those who believed in the honesty of the system got burned again", is not entirely true. Equity and debt holders have been completely wiped out. Compared to the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP), in 2008, this barely constitutes a bailout. Furthermore, if the Frank-Dodd stress test requirements for banks with greater than $50 billion had not been relaxed in 2018 to $250 billion, then SVB and Signature bank would have been seized and sold off well before there was this bank run. It is clear that even smaller regional banks need to face the same rigorous stress tests that SIBs face.
This can be true, and the Fed's move can be the right one, and it can still be case that the system has been dishonestly socialized by the back door and that this will have terrible long term consequences. It can also be that the Fed's fears were overblown and that in fact letting SVB and a few other similar banks fail would not wreck the entire system.
Equity and debt holders have been completely wiped out.
Only those who were bag holding at the moment of collapse. There will have been plenty of equity and debt holders who profited from SVB's risk-taking behavior and got out in time to realize that profit. The lesson bank equity holders will learn here is not that banks need to be more careful. It's that you can set up a bank, drive custom and profit with hyper-risky tactics, and as long as you sell your stake before the fraud collapses you'll not only get away scott free but nobody will even care because the large numbers of angry people who might organize politically to get justice will all be bought off by taxes on everyone else.
You are seeing the robustness in the actions taken by the FDIC right now. Not all failure modes can be prevented ahead of time. There is no failure-proof banking system structure.
> So that the failure of one does not lead to a domino reaction of failures?
The "domino effect" in the context of bank runs is a result of human psychology, specifically herd panic behavior - not something that can be changed by the financial system. At best it can be tempered.
However: widespread bank failures and panics can change the situation in an instant. If belief in the banking system evaporates, its not just a recession but likely a total meltdown that we’re looking at.
Toilet paper consumers should know the risk of not having 30 rolls of toilet paper stashed at all times and should face the consequences for that risk.