As for it not being Lehman, that may be true, but they DID have Lehman's CFO in their C-suite.
As for the aftermath, I'm immensely curious to see how the Fed hopes to both steepen the yield curve with higher rates while simultaneously artificially propping up long term treasury securities by allowing them to be used as collateral for short term repo at par. Guess we're just throwing out Time Value of Money altogether these days. The cure almost seems worse than the disease, but I suppose I'm just continuing to digest data like everyone else is at this point. Interesting times, that's for sure.
The issue is that their 'loans' (the bonds) didn't pay enough income, which meant that when the cheap money left they couldn't meet the terms of the cash letter from the Fed. They didn't have the income to pay the interest.
They paid too much for the bonds and assumed they'd always have non-interest bearing deposits. Schoolboy error.
And what were banks supposed to do? They make money by taking deposits and owning debt. Are they supposed to just shut down because there's no zero risk interest earning debt out there? Or charge depositors for holding their money?
This is entirely the Fed's fault if you ask me.
If our banking system is not resilient enough to survive some overhyped panic from journalists (or "journalists" in the case of Stelter), then we have much bigger problems than censoring some alarmist writers.
“Reporters who can provide historical context—explaining why 2023 is not 2008, and why SVB is not Lehman—perform a tremendous public service,” Grueskin said. “As do those who can dissect what regulatory or legislative changes enabled this collapse, and what would be required—politically as well as legislatively—to prevent a similar one from happening anytime soon.”
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