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I was hoping to find compelling reasoning--perhaps it's just the article and the book's better.
> What the student experiences as a decision to grab the pen is preceded by a jumble of competing impulses beyond his or her conscious control. Maybe their pique is heightened because they skipped lunch; maybe they're subconsciously triggered by the professor's resemblance to an irritating relative.
> [...] All of those influences subtly nudge behavior in predictable ways.
> So many factors beyond your conscious awareness brought you to that pen that it's hard to say how much you "chose" to pick it up at all.
Not very compelling at all. The most one could say is that we are not certain to have free will, not that we certainly do not.
A better way is to be pragmatic and do what we can, rather than try to decide who's at fault and punish them to our satisfaction--see Norway's system[0].
It's really interesting how we reconstruct our perspective when it's a human. If a bear were to kill a child we'd use the fact that they have no free will to summarily shoot it without a trial.
On the other hand, if it's a person, we use their lack of free will to absolve them of responsibility; or at least that's what we instinctively assume should result from their lack of free will.
I notice this seems to be what people are defending against when it comes to denying free will, but it seems like the opposite should follow. We should think that no free will means that it doesn't matter; just shoot it and be done. Yet we assume it must mean people will somehow get a "no free will pass".
Of course, there's a simple explanation that people don't like the idea of just being along for the ride. If we are punished and rewarded based on nothing, it leads to despair, similar to thinking of death with no afterlife.
Obviously, if we dismiss the person's rights for not having free will, we're also dismissing our own. That weakness aside, I just find it fascinating that the exact same reasoning is used to come to opposite conclusions.
If any vegans are here they might notice something. Bears have no rights, people have max. So perhaps we just need to improve bear rights. You could argue that when a bear eats people (in a really "bad bear" way), we should just fence it in somewhere and toss it some trash; sure it might not be happy, but it deserves the same mercy as people.
I feel like this leans too heavily into determinism. If we have no free will, and everything is predetermined based on previous states, then how many of these previous states do we need to know before we can determine the future?
The argument feels very weak regardless. Of course current actions are affected by previous actions, but just because they were affected doesn't mean they were determined by the previous actions, so it seems wrong to argue against free will via causal chains. I don't suddenly lose my agency to choose something just because someone can figure out a plausible reason for me having made that choice.
"We are all just causally linked flesh machines and nothing else, prove me wrong" feels like the opposite side of the "philosophy zombie" concept. One posits we have no choice, one posits there is nothing "making" choices, and both are much better relegated to thought experiments to prod people into thinking about how to make an argument against it.
With that in mind, the article says:
>Sapolsky, who describes himself as "majorly averse to interpersonal conflict,"..."I'm really, really, really trying not to sound like a combative jerk in the book," he said. "I deal with human complexities by going and living in a tent. So yeah, I'm not up for a lot of brawls about this."
This book and idea seem like a window into a philosopher's life where he just tells you what he believes, explains a bit, but isn't going to defend his idea much because he's just sharing the idea, not trying to authoritatively state he "solved free will" or some similar ludicrous statement.
Is there any definition of free will that is compatible with the scientific a priori of material causality? Isn't this outside the realm of the empirical?
>Isn't this outside the realm of the empirical?
I believe you are correct, and this is why it's so difficult to discuss outside of thought experiments. I only have the experience of the view from behind my eyes and can read the best interpretations/autobiographies of what a philosopher believes, but that doesn't mean I'll come to the same conclusions as my experience is different than theirs was.
I brought up the concept of Philosophy Zombies in another comment because it's a similar "unprovable" claim that can have plausible arguments that don't lead to someone changing their mind about the concept.
Deterministic automatons with no free will sound a lot like a more complicated Philosophy Zombie.
Higher animals, including humans, seem to have free will in the sense that they can imagine alternative futures, choose among them, and plan their motions accordingly.
This is essential to being able to efficiently forage or hunt for food.
In humans this leads to our well developed ability to fantasize, which is the core of our ability to think abstractly and believe in our consciousness.
Freewill is a semantic discussion. It either exists or it doesn't depending on what exactly we're talking about. That said, it is tangential to moral and ethical considerations. For example, we consider animals to be controlled by their instincts, having no freewill of their own (Sapolsky's argument describes this), therefore we absolve them of any wrongdoing. A shark is not to be blamed for biting someone's leg. What are the implications for applying this perspective on humans? Freewill deniers will often empathize with people who steal and hurt others precisely because they believe they had no choice... so what about brutal dictators that kill millions? Are they to be absolved of their wrongdoings because there is no freewill? What happens to accountability in a world without freewill?
These moral questions are important and depend on freewill, and because it's ultimately a semantic argument, it's better to define it in a way that takes into account the fact that some people are consciously making decisions, despite the fact that they were "destined" to do so.
What 'freewill deniers' are you talking about? Feels like you're making something up to be upset about (or to be fair, reading things some one wrote for that purpose).
Because the position you are describing is incoherent. Frankly, it sounds like you misunderstood a conversation about socioeconomic factors in violent crime
That was probably the wrong term to use. I just mean people who don't think freewill exists. If I misunderstood something feel free to correct me. My specific contention is how exactly you can hold someone accountable if freewill does not exist, because that necessarily means they had no choice. On what grounds are they being held responsible? Assuming they should be.
This question seems to make a lot of sense, but I think you should reconsider your assumptions ie. hidden ones.
If a lion eats your wife, do you hold it "responsible"? I think the answer is probably no. However you would get angry and shoot it (assuming you're a normal person).
So this doesn't mean very much: "responsible", "not responsible". In fact if it's a lion we use lack of free will as a REASON to use deadly force to kill (without trial). Perhaps we're not holding it "responsible", but then who cares?
Do you really care about "the principle" of being able to BLAME people for their actions, even though the outcome is pretty clearly not tied to it. Lion, blameless, shoot it to be safe. Person, blameless, better give a reduced sentence, or perhaps let off entirely.
So there's stuff going on here that we're closing our eyes and ignoring. How do we hold PEOPLE accountable? We just do. Like the Lion. You know the weird thing? Believe it or not, you would likely actually get angry at the Lion, even though it didn't really "do" anything to you.
In any case, our reasoning for acting in the face of injustices, goes further than someone did something wrong, they get punished because of their bad actions. Some aspects I can explain, but part of human nature is a little mysterious.
P.S. Here's a side theory. This philosophy exposes our privileges and this is why you get uncomfortable. Why do we kill the Lion and why do we get a trial, and maybe even let off (for not having free will, or for free will "malfunction"). Could it be because our culture and society aren't fair? Is that why this makes you feel bad? What if you replaced the Lion with a racial minority?
It's correct that our morals now say that black people count as human, but perhaps there's more going on here than we realize. Perhaps our entire way of thinking is more warped than we realize.
I am reminded of a South African court case I read a while back (which I can't seem to find now) where there was some confusion when a Japanese man was thought to be Chinese. Chinese people were not considered "white" but Japanese people were. If I remember correctly, he was trying to board a bus (or a taxi?) and was denied because of Apartheid laws but was later able to "prove" his "whiteness" by showing he was Japanese.
Humans suck at recognizing the human-ness of other humans.
Yes, I think you have. Got a couple rhetorical questions for you
What is the purpose of holding some one accountable?
Why do we not punish people if something bad happens and they could not reasonably have done anything to prevent the outcome?
The reason I'm asking is I'm under the impression you have a couple key things sort of mixed up together. Maybe another angle is to try answering the inverse of your own questions, I think you'll see free will doesn't really factor in much.
Not just playing devil's advocate either, I am personally pretty sure free will is an illusion. Happy to explore the topic further too.
> What is the purpose of holding some one accountable?
People have the capacity to process information, simulate the future, and act according to that intent. in other words, my definition of freewill is precisely the information processing the brain does which results in actions and beliefs. Accountability is a mechanism for groups of people to correct this process, in which ever way they agreed is the correct direction. Accountability isn't just to punish bad people... bad people hold their own accountable for doing what many would consider morally correct. So perhaps it's a way to align the thinking of groups of people.
> Why do we not punish people if something bad happens and they could not reasonably have done anything to prevent the outcome?
Because without intent, we can rest assured it's not a pattern, and instead an accident. In current society, accidental damages are more likely to be forgiven.
I'm a computationalist, so to me freewill is a computation that in practice is attributed to the individual with the brain. If that computation results in horrible actions i.e., murder, we hold the person accountable because we do not want those kinds of decisions in society. I understand this is compatibilism so my main argument against absolute determinists is that if you say there is no such thing as freewill it implies that this computation is not taking place in your brain but as a shared computation between the individual, the environment, and the rest of the universe. It's diluting where and how the information processing is taking place, and as a result it becomes possible to justify horrible actions.
Thank you for clarifying, I believe we actually see eye to eye on most topics here.
However, I am of the opinion that our conscious life being a purely material (not spiritual, metaphysical etc) computation leaves little room for a 'free will', any more than you would ascribe free will to any other chaotic physical phenomena. What you would call an absolute determinism position.
I'm not quite tracking what you mean by 'shared computation' and the following, that does not seem to follow at all. Did you understand what I meant about free will being illusionary?
The position you described seems to me to be narcissism, or alternatively solipsism. It is solipsistic to pity others for their lack of free will (as if it wasn't also their condition), and narcissistic to suggest others should have no opinion about your behaviors because they were out of your control. I'm not aware of anyone seriously arguing these positions, though that could be blessed ignorance :)
>I'm not quite tracking what you mean by 'shared computation'
I think they are trying to say that depending on where you believe the determination for will occurs, it might affect how much "blame" you place on someone performing wrong actions. If you believe they gathered external information and made an internal calculation to perform an action themselves, you might call that free will even if the final decision to act was affected by the external factors.
On the other end of the spectrum, I believe they were trying to say if you argue that an individual's computation of external information is not a free will action, then you must zoom out and incorporate the externalities which determined that individual computation/resulting action to start to discuss blame. This would essentially make the "free will computation" a shared computation in that deterministic externalities combine to remove individual free will and impose a sort of "cosmic will" where you blame the cosmic will for your bad actions, and try to excuse yourself as a result. I believe this is what they meant by "as a result it becomes possible to justify horrible actions."
Freewill is an illusion if you define it as at the total product or sum of all particles colliding that led to a particular decision. I'm saying is the entire universe and sum of particles is the wrong level of analysis if you want to properly hold individuals accountable. By 'shared comuptation" i just mean that broader framing of taking into account the physics of all particles. That framing is too broad and in theory can be used to justify anything. If instead we limit freewill as a computation of the brain, we can properly address the problem by holding the individual responsible for their own "computation", so to speak.
To further illustrate, imagine a room of computers that act on the world. If one computer starts going rogue, it is better to say that computer has something wrong with its software, as oppose to attributing the problem to the development process and the work ethics of the developers. Both are correct, but one is more specific and relevant.
So one scientist studies against his will for decades to conclude that nobody has free will.
Scientific Calvinism?
I'm glad you brought up the calvinism angle. The first book ever written in America which the Europeans took seriously is Johnathan Edward's book 'Freedom of the Will' (which argued there is no such thing.) It was just the next step in an already ages-long battle.
The battle has been translated--along with almost all our explanations of anything--from a theological to a scientific key. But it's the same battle, and is still a theological battle: Scientific results are one thing, but interpreting what those results mean to the human mind is inevitably a hermeneutical, not a scientific, enterprise.
We have free will; it is just very expensive, as it should be. Decisions get made 500ms before we are aware of them, and overriding those decisions causes stress.
Your source for that 500ms fact has been debunked but mostly agree with your conclusion
It it surprising that science, which is the theory of impersonal necessity, should find individual agency a rather inconceivable thing?