Actually, no, you won't. Before SaaS apps, all applications were client side. Microsoft Office, for instance, is a fully client-side application.
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... And, setting aside that Office is compiled, Office stores its files locally. When then those files move to shared space like servers, those servers get their own authentication and controls.
Unless you're really saying the Firebase can only be used securely for client apps that live entirely on the client and don't need a server at all? I hope not.
I was very interested to see what the answer is here, but the answers from the team didn't give me confidence that there is one, or that they were treating the problem with enough gravity.
Then I see answers like this one, which give me the fear. Business logic that clients can access and change isn't a security hole, it's a security catastrophe. Until it can be protected, you can't build anything more than toys with this.
Security for the data in Firebase is one issue - and as I've mentioned above we're taking that very seriously, and we're working on it.
The business implications of having client-side software are a different issue, and I think its been demonstrated many times that businesses can do very well even with most or all of their code running client-side. Any desktop / mobile software works like this, as I mentioned.
Relying on a compiler for security is a bad idea, just as you shouldn't rely on people not messing with your javascript. Clients today can access and change MS Office if they know what they are doing.
Yes, but virtually the only business logic in traditional Office is in the licensing, which has been repeatedly cracked.
You're not really comparing like with like here, unless you're saying that Firebase will solely be used for making non-networked "tool" apps.
If you're talking about networked apps, then, no, they havent always been client side. They started as tty/3270-esque apps and grew from there, with the business logic staying on the server and the clients growing in capability and power.
Boil it down: there are rules that say only managers can change vacation days, or that govern where and when discounts are applied, or who can upvote a comment, or what the power up bonus is, or whether even to check for any of these things. If these things live in the client, how are they secured from interference?
If these things live in the client, how are they secured from interference?
It doesn't sound like he's implied that this could be manipulated by the client at all; in fact, he's explicitly implied the opposite. Why would ACL definitions have to live in code (as opposed to, say, a simple Web interface)?
I'd think something as simple as a graphical UI to define database schemata with read/create/modify permissions for owner/world on each field would be enough to cover 82% of use cases effectively. Beyond that (e.g. complex group management), I can't think of a secure client-side solution off the top of my head, but I suppose that would be what the Node.js plugin could be used for.
Edit: Actually, for a lot of use cases group management could be handled by the client as well. For example, if a group is defined by a table, then the creator/owner is de facto the first member and administrator. If any administrative actions require an admin auth key and adding new members or admins is an administrative action, then there really isn't any way to hack the system. (I assume a user's auth key could just be something like a client-side hash of their username and password.)
Security needs less implications and more explicit answers.
Besides, there is more to business logic than simple (or complex) access control. More than one Facebook game has discovered to their cost the problems of trusting the score the client is sending to you. Or take discounts: if I want to give 10% off for orders over £20, where does that rule live?
If it's on the client, well, what stops the client changing that to 90% off?
Perhaps you ACL the order table and only allow access to a non-client facing instance. The client sends an order to that, which verifies it and sends it on if approved?
Well, fine, but that's a server, and one of the main pitches here is "No servers! No server code."
Sure, those are fine examples of use cases that fall outside the general category of applications which don't require server-side data validation.
You're using "security" to mean something totally different now (protection of your data from other users v. prevention of you modifying your own data in unexpected ways). My point before was that most applications just don't have that concern of limiting what users can do to their own data, at least for the MVP, because in most applications that will only affect the user herself.
It all amounts to the same thing: no server means putting your trust in the client. Which you should never do. You don't trust who the client says they are (authentication), you don't trust what the client says they can do (authorisation), you don't trust what they're giving you (validation),
It's not something you bolt on later. You have to bake this in from the start, because even the simplest operations depend on it. Posting a comment? Great: are you allowed to post? Who are you posting as? Is there HTML in your post?
It's the age of Google Docs, not Microsoft Office.
As soon as more than one user is involved, there must be some logic on the server side.