* Unauthorised key duplication. Think of a college dorm where residents all have keys, but you don't want them making copies, and keeping access to the dorm after they move out. So they use a design that most locksmiths don't have key blanks for.
* Basic keyholders getting masterkeys by taking locks apart. Think of a college dorm where they want every resident to be able to open the front door, but not each others' dorm rooms, and they want the fire department to have one key that will work for all the rooms. Because of the way masterkey systems work, a resident can take the lock off their dorm room door, measure some internal components, and figure out the cuts on the fire department master key. Restricted key blanks make this a lot harder.
Of course, this doesn't provide perfect security. Restricted keyways don't protect against someone with a CNC milling machine, or someone with a set of files and a lot of patience, or someone willing to break a window.
Modern buildings rarely install new masterkey systems these days - electronic locks are a much better system.
You can actually do it without disassembling the lock with N+1 keyblanks (where the lock has N pins).
Master keys work by having two[1] setpoints for each pin. So you copy your key N times, leaving a different pin uncut in each copy. Then just slowly file down the key until it unlocks. It will unlock in the pin-set position for your key and the pin-set position for the master key. This allows decoding the master key position for a single pin.
Finally, copy the master-key positions onto the last keyblank.
Basically it lets you turn a M^N problem (M positions, N pins) into a MN problem.
1: Assuming the non-master keys are random, there's a chance the two setpoints will be the same on any given pin/lock.
You can see that some manufacturers obviously take these items as a joke and its weird that something like these keyway spinner things subconsciously add a tiny thought of more security - when it may as well have been made of paper mache.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3I6lbpF68Q
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3I6lbpF68Q
Would love to get /u/LockPickingLawyer's opinion on this article.
A lock is only as weak as an adversary is determined.
Toddler/Child/Idiot friend is a significantly more likely to shoot you/someone you care about.
These aren't plausible attack vectors for domestic burglars (they'll just break a window), but they are meaningful threats in high-security environments. A duplicate key confounds a lot of the countermeasures used to prevent and detect unauthorised entry.
I reckon I could do it now (but for that matter I also reckoned I could do it then).
I would not back the average person's chances. It's harder than it looks.