If deploying this to end users, you may not want them to be able to footgun themselves/your org, and if you only partially trust the code, you might not want it to be able to easily turn these features on. It's not 100% (I'd rather isolate the password manager so it can't access the network, etc.)
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> you may not want them to be able to footgun themselves
This is infantilizing and demeaning to users. I'm reminded of Douglas Gwyn's quote "Unix was not designed to stop you from doing stupid things, because that would also stop you from doing clever things."
> (I'd rather isolate the password manager so it can't access the network, etc.)
You can do that without needing to compile a different version though. E.g., "flatpak --user override --unshare=network org.keepassxc.KeePassXC", or manually creating an empty network namespace to do the same for programs not available in Flatpak.
> E.g., "flatpak --user override --unshare=network org.keepassxc.KeePassXC"
Happily, flatpak is not part of a default Debian installation.
If dependencies are considered a risk without any indication of anything wrong with any particular ones, npm should be the biggest footgun ever and probably removed from the repositories altogether!
$ apt-cache depends npm | wc -l
151
> (I'd rather isolate the password manager so it can't access the network, etc.)
That won't help either: https://xkcd.com/1200/
Any program can alias the Keepass command or menu entry. It takes a vulnerability in any of, eh, *checks dpkg -l | wc -l*, over 4000 packages to supply-chain-attack my desktop setup