I've spent time in the classified world. Security can be obtained, but costs are high. At the aerospace company, we estimated for bid purposes that running a project at SECRET doubled the cost. Running at levels above that became even more expensive, and much slower. You have to partition things, so that only the really critical stuff gets the most expensive protection. It's common to have a project where the project is mostly unclassified, many things are SECRET, and a very few things are at higher levels.
The military views security as time-limited. When and where the attack will start is highly classified until the attack is underway. After that, there is no secret. New weapons systems eventually get used or cancelled, after which they're less secret. The intelligence community wants to protect info forever, though.
The credit card services get this. The CVV is required to have a higher level of protection than credit card numbers or names and addresses. Banks understand separation of functions and mutual mistrust. Most computer security work doesn't think this way.
The computer industry is determined to relearn the well-known lessons the hard way.
For example, we still have a single password breach brings down the entire system. It's like building a battleship that would sink if a 2 inch hole in the hull happened.
The way to make systems secure is not to devise a perfect password system. The way is to make the system secure in spite of password breaches. It's a completely different mindset.
To return to the battleship analogy, it isn't about preventing holes in the hull. It's about surviving holes in the hull.
In my time as a computer security specialist, this has been the most difficult thing to get other computer people to understand.
Especially when it comes to cryptography. No cryptographic system can, or is intended to, keep something secret indefinitely. The whole point is to keep the secret for long enough that by the time it's cracked, the information itself is out of date and therefore disclosure is no longer harmful (or, at least, is much less harmful).
All security, computer or otherwise, is like a fire door. No fire door will hold back a fire forever. They are all rated in terms of the number of hours they'll be effective in a fire. Security must be thought of in similar terms.
But I understand. People want perfect security and wishful thinking is seductive. People also want security "for free" -- meaning something they can install or configure and then not have to worry about it anymore. But that's impossible, in large part because actual security doesn't have a technological solution. Security is a process that depends on proper human behavior. Technology can and does act as a "force multiplier" here, but a security approach that is 100% technological is a security approach that will be subverted sooner or later.
E.g., OFFICIAL let's say is $1,000,000 PRIVATE becomes $10,000,000 SECRET becomes $100,000,000
What we did experience was the cost in time to deliver a service doubled however. E.g., OFFICIAL was 3 years, PRIVATE was 6 years and so on. I expect it varies significantly between types of system, ours was a SaaS platform that read telemetry from embedded systems on assets in the field, so I'd assume that would be one of the drivers for my differing experience than yours.
All this is about security, not integrity. Security is keeping info from getting out. Integrity is about keeping attackers from breaking things. Integrity used to be mostly a wartime problem, but now there's so much anonymity online that it's a problem all the time, a bigger one than security. Hence ransomware.
I was at one company where the PM blurted out (paraphrasing, but very close) "Enough of security talk. We will put out some nice wording on our website stating that security is our top priority and our product is perfectly secure. And that's that. We will not spend a single penny beyond that on making it so-called secure."
So, that's often what companies mean when they say "security is our top priority".
(The referred PM has since had a long career at a fruit-shaped FAANG, presumably making products secure. I hope they have grown up a bit.)
Underneath, someone had stencilled in slightly smaller script 'second only to profit'
(Somewhat less common, but refreshingly honest. Or cynical. Or both)
Increased productivity => increased profits => more safety
Nothing comes for free.
Art of the Deal indeed.
Tbh as a consumer I'd rather a company not just give self-appraisals of security in the form of overt marketing lines but let pen tests, post-mortem analyses and such speak to their robustness/lessons they've learned. Marketing is virtually always that security is top notch regardless of realities so it's hard not to be skeptical of ordinary spiels.
It's like third-party VPN services. It's all well and good to market security but when they get breached/raided/etc and it turns out they don't hold up to the claims then it just increases one's cynicism. At least those like Mullvad from everything I've seen match their statements (no affiliation, nor do I even use it, just useful for this example).
Ed Catmull of Pixar once brought up in a talk, referring to cliched lines like "Story is the most important thing" despite various productions' output being mediocre in that regard, that once an important idea can be encapsulated into a concise statement that the statement per se can be used without fear of changing behavior. Could be said for a lot of marketing.
It depends on which audience you want to reach when you want to advertise how secure your product/service is. Most people outside IT security have no idea what a penetration test is nor can they make sense of jargon-heavy post-mortems.
> I'd rather a company not just give self-appraisals of security
Companies routinely lie right to your face. No company's self-appraisal about anything is worth paying any attention to.
arsa Grace Hopper, who was quoting John Shedd.
It is certainly true that security needs can sometimes get in the way of better UX although there is plenty of security that users never encounter. It is also true that the UX of many security designs is awful. However, it is not true to say that security requirements are opposed to good UX.
You can absolutely create good UX with good security, but it will require more effort. Improving your UX doesn't normally hurt security. In fact, having better UX can help security. Conversely, improving your security does not inevitably hurt your UX (although it certainly can if you don't give it sufficient consideration).
Vs, here's 10 to 20 steps you can follow to give us the minimum permissions to use our service with a single repo. Go manually make repo specific tokens with specific permissions (10 steps) then go paste those tokens into our service (4-5 steps), now go add these actions to your repo (4-5 steps) and set these settings in that repo (5-15 steps)
So in this case, security is at odds with UX.
IMO, this is github's fault. Instead of providing an API and UX that would let users specify specific repos and choose specific permissions per repo, they did the more obvious and technically simpler thing. But, unfortunately, the more obvious easier thing, means the path of least resistance for integrations to do is ask for all permissions.
I would argue you could paint that as github has not made security their top priority. If they cared about security then the path of least resistance would lead to the most secure integrations instead of what they have now which leads to the least secure integrations.
I can't prove this is a fact, but I do know that I have yet to see an exception to it.
More sensitive data I need store, more I need to think about security as well (and more expensive it gets).
If it's obvious that the service doesn't have much worth of hacking for, it's already better starting point than if I know it's going to be hack attraction.
A company can't just do profit. Profits aren't a thing that a company can choose (typically), they aren't an input, they're an output. You can't choose your outputs, you can only choose your inputs and aim them towards specific outputs.
How do you achieve profits? Well you do things that your customers want, and one of those things might be security. For some companies, the input of investment in security will result in the output of profits. For others it won't, or the two will be less correlated. If security does convert well into profits then it follows that it should be a priority input for the company, because that's how they will achieve profits.
This is still a huge generalisation, but perhaps less of one than "profit is the top priority".
Thanks for that quote :)
Big tech companies generally care about security because most of the time, it aligns with their self-preservation. They don't want their secret sauce leaked, they don't want internal mails and payroll posted on the internet, they don't want their users hurt. It's not "top priority", but security probably shouldn't be your top priority; if it is, there is only one winning move: don't build anything. That said, security often ranks high, especially if the company had a couple of close calls before.
In contrast, preserving privacy is often in direct contrast to business goals. You want to preserve it to some limited extent to maintain user trust and avoid offending the regulators, but there is a constant business pressure to get real close to that line.
Does it sound like this? If a restaurant says that "our food is our top priority", I don't think anyone would think that means they're not going to lease a premises, buy chairs/tables, hire waiters etc.
To me, the very fact that you say something is your "_top_ priority" implies that you have other priorities.
It feels like the author is responding instead to the premise "security is our only priority".
A more apt analogy would be a restaurant saying "food safety is our top priority". To me that sounds like a restaurant that wastes a lot of plastic and produces a lot of food waste that might spoil soon.
https://i.pinimg.com/originals/71/2c/a5/712ca583647508a50606...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Km8XxRCuCho
(I don't fully agree with the message though. It's not just the user of the process that is responsible for their safety. It's mostly the designers of the process.)
I must be Dr Contrary tonight but this strikes me as bullshit.
SSH is more convenient that telnet. Passkeys are more convenient than passwords. TouchID and FaceID are more convenient than passwords.
In general, security is an afterthought that is inconvenient to developers to add back. But in the digital world I haven’t seen many examples of security being less convenient than the alternative.
(I am writing this from an airport and definitely do not assert that this applies to the built environment.)