In particular, GPT-2 to GPT-4 spans an increase from 'well read toddler' to 'average high school student' in just a few years, while simultaneously the computational cost of training less capable models goes down similarly.
Also worth noting: the article claims Stripe, another huge money raiser, had an obviously useful product. gdb, sometime-CTO of stripe and its fourth employee, is now president of OpenAI. And, most of all, the author doesn't remember how nonobvious Stripe's utility was in its early days, even in the tech scene: there were established ways to take people's money and it wasn't clear why Stripe had an offering worth switching to.
For an alternate take, I think https://situational-awareness.ai provides a well reasoned argument for the current status of AI innovation and growth rate, and addresses all of the points here on a general (though not OpenAI specific) way.
GPT-4 was released 16+ months ago. In that time OpenAI made a cheaper model (which it teased extensively and the media was sure was GPT-5) and its competitors caught up but have not yet exceeded them. OpenAI's now saying that GPT-5 is in progress, but we don't know what it looks like yet and they're not making any promises.
What I'm seeing right now suggests that we're in the optimization stage of the tech as it is currently architected. I expect it to get cheaper and to be used more widely, but barring another breakthrough on the same order as transformers I don't expect it to see the kind of substantial gains in abilities we've hitherto been seeing. If I'm right, OpenAI will quickly be just one of many dealers in commodity tech.
I have to push back on this. Anybody who had built for B2B credit card acceptance on the Web prior to Stripe's founding knew immediately what a big deal it was. For starters, they let you get up and running the same day. Second, no credit check (and associated delays). Third, their API made sense (as compared to popular legacy providers like Authorize.net) and was easy to integrate using an open source client. Fourth, self-service near-real-time provisioning. Their value proposition was immediately obvious, and they nailed all of these points in their first home page[1].
By contrast, Fee Fighters[2] was innovative for the time but still required me to fax a credit application to them. They got me up and running faster than the legacy provider, which is to say about a week. And I think I only had to talk on the phone with them once or twice. I remember really liking Fee Fighters, but Stripe was in a class of its own.
Stripe was a hit because they promised to solve hard problems that nobody else did, and then they did exactly that. (You still don't have to talk to a rep or do a personal credit check to start using Stripe!)
1 - https://www.quora.com/What-did-the-first-version-of-Stripe-l...
This "breakthrough" is often touted as AGI or something similar to it which to me is even more risky than a nuclear fusion startup as:
1. Fusion has had some recent breakthroughs that could result in a commercially viable reactor eventually.
2. Fusion has a fundamentally sound theoretical basis unlike producing AGI (or something like it).
That wasn't true at all. Stripe was a product that people were rushing to pay for it for just how good and useful it was. It was an example of success MVP that people want to pay to use and the profitability was not a problem.
The same can't be true for OpenAI. We don't know how long it can stay in the red. Maybe it can survive. Maybe its money will run dry first. We are not so sure at current stage
I also think it's a leap of logic to suggest that the former CTO of Stripe joining is somehow the fix they need, or proof they're going to accelerate.
Also, I fundamentally disagree - Stripe was an obvious business. Explaining what Stripe did wasn't difficult. The established ways of taking money were extremely clunky - perhaps there was RELUCTANCE to change, which is a totally fair thing to bring up, but that doesn't mean it wasn't obvious if you thought about it. What's so obvious about GPT? What's the magic trick here?
Anyway, again, thanks for reading, I know you don't necessarily agree, but you've given me a fair read.
I am bearish on AI because the nimbleness of humans, even the outsourced ones, is quite capable. If you only want the AI to operate in a box, then you probably can code the decision tree of the box with more specificity and accuracy than a fuzzy AI can provide.
It's a very useful tool, I'm skeptical however about how it can disrupt things economy-wide. I think it can do some things very well, but the value to the market and businesses vs. the cost of training and adapting it to the business need is quite suspicious, at least for this cycle. I think this is one of those "wait 10 years" situations and many AI companies will die within 1 to 3 years.
logarithmic, the capabilities increase with log(cost), what grows exponentially is compute used over time
I think you are misremembering. Stripe was a _big deal_. They had a curl call on their home page for a while for how to take a payment IIRC. It was like how Twilio opened the door for anyone to send SMS, Stripe made it stupid-easy to handle payments online. Nothing else at the time compared in terms of simplicity and clearly defined fees.
GPT-2 was indeed much smaller and weaker model. But the question do we have "exponential" boost after GPT3, or just marginal while competition commoditized this vertical.
Hint: it's not correct. It's nothing like exponential. It's not even order of magnitude stuff. It's tiny increments, to a system which fundamentally is a bit of a dead end.
WeWork went bankrupt. Uber briefly made money but is losing it again, and is nowhere near paying back its investors. Tesla has become a major luxury car company, and is somewhat profitable, but the stock is way overpriced for a car company. Everybody now makes electric cars, so this is a low-margin business. (Reuters: "Tesla's bleak margins sink shares as Musk hypes everything but cars.")
OpenAI, as a business, is assuming both that LLM-type AI will get much better very fast, and that everybody else won't be able to do what they do. It's unlikely that both of those assumptions hold. Look at autonomous vehicles. First tech demos (CMU) in the 1980s. First reasonably decent demos (DARPA Grand Challenge) in the 2000s. First successful deployment in the 2020s (Waymo, maybe Cruise and Zoox). Still not profitable. 40 years from first demos to deployment, probably 50 to profitability. It's entirely possible that OpenAI's business will look like that. Their burn rate is way too high to sustain for that long.
Often it takes that long, even when the basics have been figured out. Xerography was first demoed in the late 1930s. The demo machine used to be in the lobby at Xerox PARC. Profitability came in the 1960s. By the late 1970s, everybody had the technology, and it was low-margin. Electronic digital computing goes back to IBM's 1940s pre-WWII electronic multiplier experiments, but didn't come down from insanely expensive price levels until the 1980s. Memory was a million dollars a megabyte as late as the mid-1970s. Color television was first demoed in 1928, and the first color CRT was developed in the 1940s. But mainstream adoption didn't come until 1966-1967.
So what? No one has participate in the "rationalist" subculture's weird practices. It means nothing to refuse to take a bet like that, let alone that the claims made in the article are suspect (which you seem to be implying).
[I can't actually read anything beyond the tweet you linked because twitter is stupid].
Meta's open source LLM stance makes things more spicy, making it challenging for anyone generate differentiated and lasting profit in the LLM space.
At the current pace, the LLM bubble is poised to pop in a year or two - negative net revenue can't keep growing forever - barring a transformative, next-generation capability from closed-source AI companies that Meta can't replicate. All eyes on GPT-5.
Like they already did in the last 2 years?
> Have such a significant technological breakthrough that GPT is able to take on entirely unseen new use cases, ones that are not currently possible or hypothesized as possible by any artificial intelligence researchers.
Huh, what are these use-cases which no AI researcher thinks AI is capable of solving? Does the author not realize that many employees at the leading AI labs (including OpenAI) are explicitly trying to build ASI? I am so confused????????
> Have these use cases be ones that are capable of both creating new jobs and entirely automating existing ones in such a way that it will validate the massive capital expenditures and infrastructural investment necessary to continue.
Why would they have to create new jobs? They just have to be good enough that OpenAI can charge enough money for them to be in the green.
OpenAI already has a $3.4 billion ARR! Most of that is _not_ enterprise sales.
AT&T.
> I am neither an engineer nor an economist.
clearly.
If someone had come out of a copy of Google in 2000, we'd be looking at a much different picture.
What does reducing costs by "a factor of thousands of percent" mean? It starts printing money? It costs 1/10 as much?
This line is absurd. I use it constantly. 4o reads my code and generates documentation and type annotations. It generates boilerplate code. It generates logos for projects. I review all of its outputs code wise and make the odd correction here or there. I use it to check over documents before I send them. It’s replaced Stack Overflow entirely in my workflow.
I’m curious as to what’s above the author’s line for revolutionary.
OpenAI has raised $11.3bn (source the article)
Since partnering with Microsoft in 2019, Microsoft's valuation has gone from $0.7tn to $3.1bn, or an increase of $2.4tn, a lot of that on AI enthusiasm.
Microsoft can sell some shares to fund OpenAI, 2.4tn being about 200x what they've put in.
Sure the market bubble will pop at some stage but not by 200x. I'm skeptical of the they can't survive argument.
Also I recall in the early days of Facebook, Google and Amazon people saying they lose money each year, the first two didn't have a monetization model, how will they get by? But of course they ended up some of the world's most profitable companies. With AI also you have to think a few years down the road when ASI's output may exceed the current global GDP ($100tn or so).
"I ultimately believe that OpenAI in its current form is untenable."
Followed by a bunch of reasons why. Later they write:
"What I am not saying is that OpenAI will for sure collapse, or that generative AI will definitively fail"
What? Didn't they just explain 100 different reasons why they think think OpenAI will fail? There was also this:
"To be clear, this piece is focused on OpenAI rather than Generative AI as a technology — though I believe OpenAI's continued existence is necessary to keep companies interested/invested in the industry at all."
To be clear? So they are trying to separate OpenAI from gen AI. Then they throw in a hyphen and say, oh but without OpenAI, companies would stop spending time and money on gen AI. Ok, thank you for the..clarification.
I stopped reading after that.
"GPT-4o Mini (OpenAI's "cheaper" model) already beaten in price by Anthropic's Claude Haiku model"
GPT-4o Mini is presently cheaper than Claude 3 Haiku.
Maybe, but based on the egregious errors the author has made in previous articles, they probably don't have the ability to understand or reason about any of the data they read. Also note that despite what's implied by this statement, most of this article is not sourced, it's just the opinions of the author who admits they have no qualifications.
I didn't read the entire gish gallop, but spot-checked a few paragraphs here and there. It's just the kind of innumerate tripe that you should expect from Zitron based on their past performance.
> Have a significant technological breakthrough such that it reduces the costs of building and operating GPT — or whatever model that succeeds it — by a factor of thousands of percent.
You can't reduce the cost of anything by more than 100%. At that point it's free.
But let's consider the author's own numbers: $4B in revenue, $4B in serving costs, $3B in training costs, $1.5B in payroll. To break even at the current revenue, OpenAI need to cut their serving costs and training costs by about 66% ($1.3B+$1B+$1.5B<$4B), not by "thousands of percent".
> As a result, OpenAI's revenue might climb, but it's likely going to climb by reducing the cost of its services rather than its own operating costs.
... Sorry, what?
Reducing operating costs does not increase revenue. And I don't know how the author thinks that reducing cost of services would not reduce operating costs.
> OpenAI's only real options are to reduce costs or the price of its offerings. It has not succeeded in reducing costs so far, and reducing prices would only increase costs.
Reducing prices does not increase costs.
> I see no signs that the transformer-based architecture can do significantly more than it currently does.
So, here's a prime example of the author basing the "analysis" on them personally "seeing no signs" of something they have no expertise to evaluate. There's no source for this claim, and it's pretty crucial for their conclusions that transformers have hit a wall.
> While there may be ways to reduce the costs of transformer-based models, the level of cost-reduction would be unprecedented,
But for a given quality of model, haven't the inference costs already gone down by like 90% this year?
> particularly from companies like Google, which saw its emissions increase by 48% in the last five years thanks to AI.
It should be pretty obvious to somebody who can read publicly available data that all of the increase over 5 years can't be attributed to AI.
As of today all of the evidence indicates the LLM paradigm is saturated.
Why all the hand-wringing about hypotheticals? As of today this stuff is a failed experiment.
Altman or Amodei coming up with the goods is a tail X-risk.
Citation?
LLMs bring the cost of writing software close to $0. We can finally live in a world of truly bespoke code.
I, for one, welcome back the web of the early 2000s.