It's because it reads mostly as a retread of the far-better known Samuel Butler pieces like _Erewhon_ years before (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwin_among_the_Machines was 1863), and which Eliot likely read given her lifestyle & how closely she echoes him. Surprising to see no mention of Butler at all in OP, given what critical context it is - she was not writing in a vacuum.
Some earlier discussion: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/goANJNFBZrgE9PFNk/shadows-of...
(If I recall correctly I learned about Dyson's book from a postscript to Neal Stephenson's "Quicksilver.")
Same story with Star Wars and droids: C3PO wasn't sentient, just a protocol model loaded into a droid frame in the wrong environment, it's attempts to constantly being the conversation back to politeness being a simplistically coded filter layer.
And the fact that these LLMs are used as 'protocol droids' to communicate with lower-level devices - 'the binary language of moisture vaporators' etc. - matches up with the pattern of LLMs as tools for generating scripts in Python.
Terrible though the last sequel is, they even managed to include jailbreaking Threepio to get him to access part of his training data that had been censored out.
And all of a sudden, LLMs absolutely have the command of natural language that once seemed such an obvious indicator of sentience, and now I find myself one of those bigots who don't believe in robot rights!
I'm being silly, but I do think there are implications here with respect to the future debate on AI sentience. I guess I once thought there would be this threshold where the reality of an AI's inner experience became blatantly obvious, but I see now that this is going to be a profoundly thorny problem.
Who knows, maybe in several decades we'll have a consciousness-o-meter that demonstrates that LLMs have had some degree of awareness all along.
True artificial intelligence would have the ability to meaningfully and significantly improve itself, recursively - a characteristic of even the most primitive life on Earth.
And the implications of a computing system capable of such simply can't be overstated. With access to essentially all contemporary knowledge, flawless recall, and stupidly ridiculous amounts of energy to power itself (relative to e.g. a brain), it would create an explosion of knowledge in every single domain imaginable, and many we can't even yet fathom. And it would be doing this at an accelerating pace owing to self improvement.
Basically the very nature of existence and knowledge would change. Sentience or not would be irrelevant as we simply tried (and inevitably failed, miserably) to catch up.
But this is a bit further out of reach than 'can vaguely pass for a human in a casual non-adversarial q&a style chat.'
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This was one of the rather many areas where Star Trek failed to really consider the implications of its concepts, probably because it would simply break the world building. The Borg, for instance, would be defacto Gods in no time, even without assimilation.
This is true of pretty much all scifi! It's funny seeing super-futuristic depictions of star-fighter pilots and combatants with firearms and its just...so crushingly evident that humans will not have supremacy in these arenas very shortly.
Frank Herbert must have anticipated this complication and side-stepped the whole issue by preemptively canonizing the Butlerian Jihad.
Exactly, mechanically by tools, environmentally by science, metaphysically by philosophy. An AI can only become an I by crossing a singularity of knowledge.
Someone should re-dub the Enterprise computer's lines with it.
To paraphrase Chonsky (link below), the legacy of Descartes' observations for "mechanical philosophy" is profound: substance-dualism became untenable because no coherent idea of material can be formulated. Newton exorcised the machine (material), leaving the ghost intact to be curious about itself.
Today we study the organism called the body without need of a philosophical grounding in any reality. "mechanical philosophy" ended with Newton's work obviating any coherent notion of an "intelligible world". Faced with unreconcilable confusion about what constitutes reality, science quietly abandoned the idea and moved ahead with "intelligible theories about the world", which Chomsky regards as one of most significant shifts in science.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=bWDJ2zFe4Pc
In various speeches and lectures on the history of science and linguistics, Chomsky comments on artificial intelligence, by referring to Alan Turing's seminal paper, in which Turing proposed the so-called "test." Chomsky refers to the paper's first paragraph where Turing concedes that the meaning of the word "intelligence" is so indistinct as to be left to be determined by Gallop. Turing punts on the entire question of the meaning of intelligence by suggesting an "imitation game."
Today's state of the art of machine intelligence has not advanced past Turing's proposal. Chomsky wonders if we may have to resign ourselves to the limit that it never will, in which light of reason we might embark on further study of ourselves, rather than contrive facsimiles and endure all the attendant hazards.
I think it's an incoherent concept. If the 'soul' is anything, there is some difference in the brain that would allow it. You can't have two people with identical brains and claim that one has a soul, unless you believe in magic.
To maintain that belief you have to either believe there is a physical source of consciousness, or that consciousness doesn't exist, neither of which most people can accept, yet LLMs are forcing people to confront.
The problem is that subjective experiences don't fit well with objective explanations. Nagal laid this out in his paper, "What it's like to be a bat", and other philosophers like Chalmers expanded on it with p-zombies and blind color scientists.
Something that predicts no observable differences is unfalsifiable aka bullshit.
From there I think "we don't know how" is in part down to needing advances in neuroscience, and in part down to "consciousness" being a hazy term with disagreement over definition. But for frameworks that accept the above (physicalism, interactionist dualism, ...) I do think it's in theory testable whether something is conscious for any given pinned-down definition (e.g, "are the neurons constituting internal train of thought firing"), and I would be inclined to say the frameworks that don't accept the above are indeed the more "bullshit" ones.
> Theophrastus closes by asking whether human consciousness is a ‘stumbling’ on the way to ‘unconscious perfection’.
This reminds me of a line from the scifi novel Echopraxia where one of the characters explains that as AIs become more intelligent, they 'wake up' and become conscious like humans. But then as they continue to grow, they eventually go back to sleep - and those are the machines to be afraid of. '
The Mass Effect series describes the Reapers as (copied from masseffect.fandom.com - I <3 this game's lore):
"The Reapers are a highly-advanced machine race of synthetic-organic starships. The Reapers reside in dark space: the vast, mostly starless space between galaxies. They hibernate there, dormant for fifty thousand years at a time, before returning to the galaxy...the Reapers spare little concern for whatever labels other races choose to call them, and merely claim that they have neither beginning nor end."
The other pop-sci-fi analogue I can think of is The Borg.
It comes across as satire to me, which I did not expect after reading TFA.
From the classical references littered throughout the portions I've skimmed, it seems like a learned person is joking about contemporary men that aren't as well educated and unaware of it.
Quite reminiscent of some of the stuff Kierkegaard wrote.
>When H. G. Wells' novella The Time Machine was published in 1895, The Guardian wrote in its review: "The influence of the author of The Coming Race is still powerful, and no year passes without the appearance of stories which describe the manners and customs of peoples in imaginary worlds, sometimes in the stars above, sometimes in the heart of unknown continents in Australia or at the Pole, and sometimes below the waters under the earth. The latest effort in this class of fiction is The Time Machine, by H. G. Wells."
So the phrase "the Coming Race" must have been well established in literary circles, and probably used as a shorthand for what today we might call non-humans or post-humans.
If you want to know what life is like when society is run by alien intelligences, ask someone who lives under an economy dominated by megacorps.
It was akin to a sensation of VR games where my mind seems to interpolate real-life expectations with visual input, but not quite. Not quite "brain-computer-interfaces", but perhaps a glimpse with current tech.
What a terribly small imagination this presents. There is life outside of your cubicle. There always was.
> Each time a person engages in work that could be done more efficiently by a machine, the employing party—be that company, government or charity—will have to bear the opportunity cost of using AI.
Your LLMs run on GPUs and have no physical component. Those physical components aren't free, require maintenance, and break at inconvenient times. This is not a zero sum future or one that doesn't require intelligent economic planning.
> It’s like when a toddler ‘helps’ you wash the dishes.
It's cute you presume your "AGI" is going to /want/ to do anything for you. In particular, mundane chores, like washing your dishes, or that you as an individual would be able to afford it.
Anyways, it's an interesting past time around here, rather than admit the gulf between the current technologies and what AGI is imagined to be, we just troll through the past looking for anyone who even remotely made a "thinking machine" part of a fictional story.
Well, one part she got right, the machine presents itself as something of a useless chat bot.