It is not easy to get verified in vscode marketplace, even major publishers like Qt organization are not verified much less so a solo open source developer like myself.
If your name sounded English the implicit bias would make you sound more trust worthy.
Qt organization (because you mentioned it) also has verification. It displays a different message (because I haven't installed anything from them):
> The extension Qt Core is published by Qt Group. This is the first extension you're installing from this publisher.
> Qt Group has verified ownership of qt.io.
> Visual Studio Code has no control over the behavior of third-party extensions, including how they manage your personal data. Proceed only if you trust the publisher.
EDIT: I'm sure there are other extensions that are also by unverified publishers. It was the first time I was hit with that message though.
The problem is that nobody will do that. Even if it were 500 LOC.
And this is why supply chain attacks are on the rise.
> nobody will do that
"nobody" is a strong word. Yes, most people don't do that, but if a single person reads the source code and finds something nefarious they can report it or leave a review disclosing that and my reputation would be ruined.
I don't think it's good to constrain people in some way from doing that, you should just have a personal policy of avoiding extensions you're not involved in the development of.
My intention was to highlight that the SW supply chain nowadays is an insecure mess.
Regarding your last point, for the vast majority of open source SW releases, we can never be sure if the release we get is produced from the same code we see. I do not know if that is the case with VScode addons, but you get my point
You actually can depackage vscode's .vsix files (it is just a zip file) and compare the package contents to the repository.
Again, I am not questioning your integrity or your plugin.
I do it with the code I download to extend Emacs.