1. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2026/02/01/python-c...
- OpenIndiana
- FreeBSD
- Debian GNU/Linux
So not complete YOLO.
See https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-inetutils/2015-03/msg...
FWIW, a well known LLM agent, when I asked for a review of the patch, did suggest it was dodgy but didn't pick up the severity of how dodgy it was.
Which one?
If you don't care that it's read ("it's nothing secret"), but you do care that it's not modified, you should not use unencrypted plain text. That's why I explained that if you don't care if it's read that is not a sufficient justification to use unencrypted plain text, because then it might be modified, and you might care about that.
You then said that it "literally" is: if you don't care if it's read ("it's nothing secret") that is a sufficient justification to use unencrypted plain text.
But then you proceed to give an example where it is, indeed, ok to use unencrypted plain text, but only because you don't care if it's read ("it's nothing secret"), AND you don't care if it's modified. That is what I have been saying all along. If you were to care that the wind speed from the sensor on your roof is not faked, then you should not use unencrypted plain text.
So again: If you don't care that it's read, AND you don't care if it's modified, then, sure, use unencrypted plain text.
If you don't care that it's read ("it's nothing secret"), but you do care that it's not modified, that is not sufficient justification to use unencrypted plain text. Rather, in addition, you also have to not care if it's modified.
Let me give you an example. Air pressure varies, and airplanes use air pressure to measure altitude, so they need to set their altimeter to the correct air pressure. Now, the air pressure is not secret at all. Anyone could trivially measure it. So, one doesn't care if it's read ("it's nothing secret").
According to your faulty thinking, one could thus use unencrypted plain text to transmit it. However, someone could modify it, giving wrong numbers to the airplane, putting the airplane and the crew in danger. That is not good. No-one cares that the data is read ("it's nothing secret"), but we do care that it is not modified. Thus, do not use unencrypted plain text. Because if you don't care if it is read ("it's nothing secret"), that is not sufficient justification to use unencrypted plain text. You have to, in addition, not care if it is modified.
In your case, you don't care if it is read ("it's nothing secret"), AND you don't care if it modified. But someone else might not care if it is read, but DO care if it is modified.
Do you understand this now, or should I make a full 2x2 matrix with all possibilities and carefully explain each case with examples?
As a data point, my first tech job was QA for a COBOL compiler vendor. They supported roughly 600 permutations of architecture, operating system, and OS version with a byte-coded runtime and compiler written in C. I maintained a test runner and suite with many thousands of tests, ranging from unit tests to things like Expect UI tests. This was considered routine in the compiler vendor field, and in the scientific computing space I moved into. I worked with someone who independently reproduced the famous Pentium FDIV bug figuring out why their tests failed, which surprised no one because that was just expected engineering.
Then you had the other end of the industry where there was, say, 50k lines of Visual Basic desktop app where they didn’t even use version control software. At a later job, I briefly encountered a legacy system which had 30 years of that where they had the same routine copied in half a dozen places, modified slightly because when the author had fixed a bug they weren’t sure if it would break something else so they just created a copy and updated just the module they were working on.
In this case the hero's name is apparently Simon Josefsson (maintainer).
Ah, someone beat me to it!
/s