Surely this depends on how the vendor sets their prices? If you're going to buy something from a website to test a stolen credit card you don't just get to make up your own prices.
And I think you may be over-indexing on the US "prices don't include tax" thing. Elsewhere, round-number prices are extremely common.
In fact a lot of the rest of the stuff in the post seems like it wouldn't work very well either. (E.g. you're flagging anyone who has done a transaction in the last 90 days outside the range of hours at which they have 2+ transactions? Wouldn't that be like 50% of people?).
It's unclear to me whether this article is an attempt at breaking down complex expertise into over-simplified SQL queries, or whether it is all speculative and made up.
There is a conflict between "Six SQL patterns I use to catch transaction fraud" and "Nothing here comes from anything I’ve actually worked on or seen".
I don't usually buy gas, coffee or snacks at 2am. But on the very rare occasion that I do, I'm dealing with some kind of personal emergency and don't also want to have to call my bank.
I get that that's also a time opportunistic thieves, etc, might be operating. But the cost of false positives is also a thing.
Coffee usually _is_ a round number in my experience, and I know of people who aim for round numbers when filling their car, and of fuel stations which require a pre-set value, often 10, 20, 50€ etc
Card got blocked as they thought it was fraud. Annoying! And not something inebriated me wanted to deal with at 2am.
Ok. Maybe they protected me from myself, but still!
a) trivial to bypass by adding dither to the test transactions and
b) trivial to improve upon with proper statistical analysis and
c) shouldn't this kind of heuristic pattern recognition with no expectation of near-100% accuracy be what AI is good at?
> When a skimmer compromises a card reader at, say, a gas pump, you don’t get one fraud case. You get dozens. Every card swiped at that pump for the next few weeks is now in someone’s database. So the symptom from the merchant side is: an unusual number of unrelated cards spending more than usual, in a short window.
So he checks for hour-bucketed increases in high-value transactions originating from that merchant.
Seems to me like a good way to catch a sale, an opening, a launch event, or a product “drop,” a single high-value sale that somebody spreads across several cards… less so a good way to detect a steady trickle of stolen card data that’s inexplicably used back at the same merchant.
If you’re installing a card skimmer, why would you charge the stolen cards at the same business where you’re stealing them? And why would you concentrate your spending into bursts if the skimmer’s harvesting all day every day?
If you’re the merchant doing the skimming in order to spend at your own store, wouldn’t it be easier to punch a higher amount into the terminal? If you’re a skimming ring, wouldn’t you prefer to have purchasing power rather than this $5000 threshold (?!) of extra gas (plus a giant neon sign advertising where you placed your skimmer)?
Wouldn’t a more sensible approach involve something like looking for merchant clusters in the combined transaction histories of known-stolen accounts?
The LLM runs so strong in this whole enterprise… I want to give the person the benefit of the doubt, but I can’t resist the sneaking suspicion that LLM fabulism to push a slop novel just wasted 15 minutes of my life.
We learn simultaneously that 'your team' shouldn't rely on any one of those patterns ('none of them is enough'), but that pattern 1 'alone will surface a useful amount of fraud'.
We also read strange sentences like "Every analyst on your team will use them (ie window functions) once they exist, and adding the next fraud pattern stops being a project. [end of paragraph]"
Or irrelevant discussions about how filtering by "IS NULL" might be not applicable when almost none of the provided examples uses it (and the one which does uses it in different context).
This is low quality and too long.
Or normal people living in Europe in border-adjacent areas.
Also, I guess you don't include card-not-present transactions in this, but you incorrectly assume that every merchant has their location set correctly. And that every sale happens in a brick-and-mortar establishment, not from travelling salespeople or whatever. And that all transactions happen online.
"Fixel Smith" is an AI-generated person, with an article that has very little to do with fraud analysis. 'This' is also a music artist (1), novelist (2), fraud analyst (3), influencer (4), and whatever else you can imagine.
220+ points and 70 comments, and very few notice it's quite a fake post — and no one that it's an AI generated person?
1. https://www.amazon.it/Forged-Soundtrack-Explicit-Fixel-Smith...
Makes me wonder if this AI flood uncovers the unflattering truth about this community acuteness, or it's only a failure of existing guardrails and we just need to change them.
I question the described approaches. For example, while impossible travel is a legitimate and widely used technique, it's related to online user behaviour based on IP address. Moreover, tirreno, for example, has separate rules for cases where the IP clearly comes from Apple Relay or VPN/Tor — those are separate flags. I assume some or all examples are LLM-generated, as the context is mixed up and no one actually collects GPS location in bulk for card swipes.
> The roundness is the signal.
> Slight pain, same result.
to point at a few.
It's also not all program-integrity, which is the only work that could justify such blanket statements. Worse is better as long as it addresses the problem domain.
Fintech clients are generally interested in knowing whether a transaction happening _right now_ is fraud. They want to know that in a few milliseconds, for high-dimensional data. It's work done at a scale where relational databases cannot meet these real-time constraints, and instead find other uses like historical data loading. That's how you end up with in-memory databases, stream-processing engines, and yes, even machine learning.
Having said that, some of the author's points are valid, and I'm looking forward for their next writings, in particular dealing with noisy alerts is a general problem beyond performance engineering.
For example "Impossible travel": these days you can add your credit card to your phone and use Apple Pay. Well, this is useful for many things, one of them being adding your credit card to your kid's (teenager) phone, so that your kid can use your card in case of need/emergency when they are away from you. I did exactly that recently and actually worried about fraud control systems when my child paid using my card in Boston while I was in Europe.
Many things which you think are true might not be.
Anecdotally, US banks are terrible at building fraud control systems. It seems US banks assume any transaction that is charged by an entity outside the US is fraud. In my 10-year history of running a SaaS, the US banks and their "fraud control" systems have been one of the biggest billing problems.
If a card swipes in Chicago and seven minutes later swipes in Los Angeles, one of those swipes is fake.
How does this work with online shopping? When I am sitting on the couch and buy from Amazon, where does the address get registered?Can also imagine an edge case: couple shares an online account, one is traveling and purchases with the saved card details.
This is an underrated CX factor: If my card gets denied when i’m a new customer or exhibiting a new pattern, i’m impressed with their software.
However if they deny a transaction where there is any previous history of me authenticating, then I’m frustrated by their naive paranoid algorithm.
So this is really just surfacing cases, but with not enough context to be useful to prioritise. I would expect a score to be included.
Apart from that it misses a lot of signals like refunds, declines, disputes etc [1].
1) https://stripe.com/gb/guides/improve-fraud-management-with-r...
But I must admit there was a point where I suddenly lost my love for SQL and it was pretty much when the OVER PARTITION BY syntax appeared.
It never clicks. I always have to look up how it works, I always find it unintuitive. I've never understood why I hate it so much.
What about the tables?
Or, the cardholder is trying to do the cannonball run:
Signal's he can check? So some random dude is looking at my credit card purchase history while playing around with his SQL queries?
Lagging window functions and/or lateral joins probably would have reduced it to 1/4 the size but definitely increased the cost versus just narrowing the sets into smaller tables first.
Bunch of thresholds, no data proving those thresholds are meaningful.
chargeback-mcp
or would you turn it all into a markdown file and call it a skill?
How do you deal with vacations and online shopping. You could be in another country or two in a few hours and purchase from across the world
Machine learning systems also learn your pattern. The article gives simple SQL rules. Don't dismiss this article as worthless.
> Most people are creatures of habit when they spend money. A nine-to-fiver doesn’t suddenly start buying gas at 3am.
Breaking out of a habit once in a while is what keeps one's mind sharp.
A big "fuck you" to financial analysts with those groundhog-day mindsets for making my life much more miserable than it needs to be and for adding a chilling effect to those little getaways that make life interesting and worthwhile. I despise you for this.