Let me rebut two points that kind of irk me:
You claim that the Android problem that bit several Bitcoin wallets was due to java.security.SecureRandom using /dev/urandom.
That is mistaken, as the blog posting you gave clearly shows:
"Developers who use JCA for key generation, signing or random number generation should update their applications to explicitly initialize the PRNG with entropy from /dev/urandom or /dev/random."
So, in their opinion, /dev/urandom is fine.
Furthermore you claim that I've taken quotes out of context.
I was aware that there is the danger of misunderstanding these people's point of view, so I emailed all three of them, right when I put this web page up some days ago, specifically asking them if they felt that I might be misrepresenting them or if they are otherwise unhappy about me using their names.
Of those three two replied (both very quickly).
Daniel Bernstein replied very shortly with "Seems reasonable.", but noted that he disagrees with the "more entropy cannot hurt" point. That's why I added the little sidebar with a link to his blog posting.
Thomas Pornin seems to have taken the time to really read the article, he wrote "That's a fine page. I like it.", noted a mistake in the boot scripts section (that I have fixed) and suggested some additional points to discuss (which I did not put on the page).
Off-topic remark: All in all I was really fascinated how easy it is to get in touch with those highly-respected people, and how respectful they treat "us normals". :-)